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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Control: 16171
Rec'd: October 20, 1964
8:34 a.m.

FROM: Dar-es-Salaam
ACTION: Secstate 806
INFO: Lisbon 27
Lourenco Marques 23
Luanda 10
Lusaka 54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *HM*

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DATE: October 19, 8 p.m.

DAR ES SALAAM 806

1. Mondlane returned Dar-es-Salaam October 15. Over week-end saw separately Embassy contact and journalist we believe reliable in off-record briefing. Their versions agree on all main points.

2. Frelimo responsible for 7 raids into Mozambique since late September. These covered 800-mile arc but numerically were small scale, about 20 men in each, and are opening phase action plan designed force Portuguese eventually into negotiations for self-determination Mozambique. They signify completion training sufficient number nationalists for militant action and establishment secure means supply to Frelimo groups operating inside Mozambique. They will be repeated against military targets on scale at least once month in present phase. Frelimo hopes minimum violence will persuade Portuguese wisdom of negotiating but is prepared increase scope and undertake sabotage in cities if greater violence required.

3. Mondlane acknowledged initial raids produced mixed results and said he would have preferred wait longer to improve Frelimo security and cadre training. As he described operations, raiders filtered over border individually and regrouped inside Mozambique before hitting targets. Only objective he identified was airfield at Mueda and said

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casualties even on both sides. Of 7 raiding parties 3 groups captured allegedly because Portuguese intelligence had learned of plans in advance in GURTZ; 2 groups dispersed with some dead and wounded but survivors still in Mozambique; and 2 groups intact inside Mozambique for organizational work and future operations.

4. Mondlane said 8th group had entered Mozambique earlier, organized by Manu under Fernandez. This party had killed Dutch priest. According Mondlane Manu leaders had been persuaded by certain Kenyans while resident Mombasa that Mau Mau tactics likely be more successful than organized military action. Theory was Europeans would flee from Panga and spear primitivism but would stand and fight against conventional arms and modern tactics. Mondlane thought this ridiculous and implied Frelimo group had taken Fernandez prisoner.

5. On Mozambican refugees, Mondlane used figure 7000 now in Southern Tanganyika. He expected number would increase rapidly to "tens of thousands" and said Frelimo intelligence indicated Portuguese authorities intended clear out much larger area along Malawi and Tanganyikan borders. Mondlane said Portuguese would not evacuate African population from frontier zones to safer areas inside Mozambique but would drive them across Tanganyikan border as form of reprisal against GURTZ.

6. Mondlane said Nyerere still hoped Portuguese could be induced to negotiate before major violence breaks out but is under great pressure from Tanu and from other African states relax GURTZ restraints on Frelimo action in view absence any political progress. Mondlane thought LONDON TIMES editorial October 12 was good statement Nyerere's dilemma in face Portuguese confidence their military superiority would permit them indefinitely put off self-determination. Mondlane was particularly critical GURTZ

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ban on Frelimo press conferences which prevented publicity for Frelimo's version of events. Hoped GURTZ decision would soon be changed as no effective counter Portuguese propaganda possible under present conditions.

7. Mondlane said he would make personal effort to call Commission African Liberation Committee meeting on Mozambique border situation and Frelimo plans.

8. Comment: We have no solid information on scope or extent hostilities inside Mozambique. Initiation violence during Mondlane's absence on European tour and implication his remarks on need for longer training Frelimo fighters suggest both continuing divisions inside Frelimo and pressure more militant Frelimo types are exerting on present leadership. Ydcext* actual violence to date may be less significant than pattern of action and counter-action on both sides of border now beginning to emerge and threatening to involve wider areas of political leadership and military action.

GP-3.

LEONHART

*As received

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