

# MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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## Chissano: talk to insurgents

"Dialogue must never be ruled out, whatever the conflict. We have to find who to dialogue with and what to dialogue about", former President Joaquin Chissano said in a speech Thursday (1 October). "Dialogue should never be discarded", he said, and an "an interlocutor" must be found among the armed groups that are carrying out attacks in Cabo Delgado. He gave his own example of pursuing dialogue with Renamo. (Lusa 1 Oct, *O Pais* 2 Oct) As soon as he took over after the death of President Samora Machel, he began the search for people to talk to Renamo. It was not straightforward, but eventually succeeded.

Chissano also urged caution in bringing in foreign troops. "We must be very careful about what kind of outside intervention, because not everyone who comes from outside can have the capacity to do good work, and they risk dying," Chissano said. "They have to be forces to fight, forces that know the terrain and have experience for a guerrilla war. All these are factors that the authorities must evaluate, because whoever comes must be strong, so that there is no disaster in the theatre of operations". Therefore it is better to "give greater capacity to our own forces to fight terrorists". (VoA 1 Oct)

## Guebuza: Learn lessons from our guerrilla wars

Meanwhile former President Armando Guebuza suggests looking back to the tactics of former guerrilla wars - not just Frelimo in the liberation war but Renamo in its guerrilla war against the government. "It is essential to exploit the capacities installed over all these years, even those of Renamo. They made war for 16 years. Are we working with them to find solutions to this problem? I don't think so," Armando Guebuza said in a video posted on his Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/armandoemilioguebuzanz/> Mozambique should not "marginalize those who have experiences. ... We have in government people who participated in the liberation struggle and even became officers. Are they being properly used? I don't think so". (Lusa 2 Oct)

## Talk of military intervention continues

It is now widely reported that the French navy will take over coastal patrolling. The US is said to be close to signing a military training agreement and hopes to have soldiers in Mozambique this year. The US, in turn, has asked Zimbabwe to provide troops. Bloomberg (29 Sep) reports that the request came in a phone call between US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tibor Nagy and Zimbabwe Foreign Minister Sibusiso Moyo last week. The foreign minister pointed out that targeted sanctions against Zimbabwean officials made it difficult to cooperate with the US. But Moyo also told Nagy that it could be part of a broader normalising of relations.

Bloomberg notes that Zimbabwe's army is battle-hardened with its troops having fought in the DRC and supported US operations in Angola and Somalia. Zimbabwean troops played an important role in defending the Beira corridor from Renamo in the 1980s, and some senior officers were based in Mozambique during their own liberation war in the 1970s.

Zimbabwe has troops but no money so someone will need to pay. But it would look better if the US came in with Zimbabwe under SADC cover.

There is also a suggestion that Angola, which has worked on security with Total and other oil companies, might be willing to provide troops.

The South African *Vrye Weekblad* (25 Sep) reports that "an arms manufacturer from South Africa, which is already linked to a string of controversial arms deals elsewhere in Africa, is now also involved in the provision of weapons and training to the Mozambican army." Support includes three attack helicopters, four mine resistant armored vehicles, and training at farms in South Africa. The company is unnamed but *Vrye Weekblad* says the contract was signed at the company's UAE offices - a further indication of UAE links (see newsletter 502 last week)

Minister of Foreign Affairs Verónica Macamo said Mozambique will not ask the UN to send a military force. (DW 30 Sep) The UN can only send peacekeeping forces after a peace agreement.

## Total CEO tells Europe: IS has 'enclave' in Mozambique

"Western powers are realizing that a Daesh [Islamic State] enclave is settling within Mozambique," which is "a major problem" for East Africa's stability, Total Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Patrick Pouyanne said Thursday (1 Oct) at a press conference near Paris. "It would be good if the situation is brought back under control, not just for Total's project, but for the stability of the region." (Bloomberg 1 Oct)

Pouyanne called on European nations to help Mozambique fight an insurgency backed by Islamic State. His statement was clearly intended to put pressure on the EU to provide military help to Mozambique - as requested by Mozambique and backed by Portugal.

## Stories of first insurgents

Mozambican researchers are doing excellent investigations into the first insurgents - how they became radicalised, how they recruited others, and how they are being supported. Three new studies are very important in understanding the roots of Al Shabaab, as it is called locally.

The Centre for Investigative Journalism (CJI, 22 & 29 Sep) has published two articles in English about local insurgent (Al Shabaab) leaders and how they gain support and protection. CJI identifies Bonomado Machude Omar (aka Ibn Omar) as the speaker in a March video that went viral, and is seen as a leader. His father was a teacher and local politician, and he attended a local secondary school in Mocimboa da Praia and gained high marks, before going abroad to study Islam. When he

returned he preached an extreme form of Islam and won support from some community leaders and local people. <https://cjimoz.org/news/bonomado-machude-omar-ou-ibn-omar-the-mozambican-face-of-terrorism-in-cabo-delgado/>.

The other article is about Abdala Likonga (aka Alberto Shaki) from Mocimboa da Praia, who is said to be the "mastermind" of some of the insurgent offensives. He started trading and eventually opened a shop in Palma selling construction material and car parts. He was radicalised in Kenya and DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo). He faked his death and was involved in the 5 October 2017 attack on Mocimboa da Praia. <https://cjimoz.org/news/lifting-of-the-fog-reveals-ring-leaders-behind-cabo-delgado-terrorism>

IESE (Institute of Economic and Social Studies) identifies André Idrissa from Cogolo village, Pangane, on the coast of Macomia district as one of the first faces of Al Sabaab. His story is told in a fascinating and detailed investigation by Sérgio Chichava, research director of IESE, in a 28 September report.

The son of a local Sheik, Idrissa was born in 1986, and became a local businessman, selling basic goods and motorcycle parts he bought in Tanzania. He gained high social prestige. In his trade with Tanzania he was influenced by Wahhabi followers, and then more radical Tanzanian sheiks. He set up a local mosque in 2015 and attracted a following among local youth. He came into conflict with traditional mosques. He was part of the original attack on Mocimboa da Praia on 5 October 2017.

Chichava notes that Cogolo has since been attacked by both Al Shabaab and the defence forces (FDS). Women were raped by FDS forces and in late 2019 eight youths were executed by the FDS despite protests by community authorities that they were not Al Shabaab.

IDeIAS\_Nº 134E – "The first faces of 'Al Shabaab'" in Cabo Delgado" - English <http://bit.ly/IDEIAS-134> and in Portuguese <http://bit.ly/IDEAS-134p>.

Also from IESE:

IDeIAS\_Nº 130e : "Faced with the conflict in the north, what can Mozambique learn from its civil war (1976 – 1992)?" by Salvador Forquilha and João Pereira - English <http://bit.ly/IESE-130> and in Portuguese <http://bit.ly/IESE-130p>.

IDeIAS\_Nº 129e – "The first signs of 'Al Shabaab' in Cabo Delgado: some stories from Macomia and Ancuabe" by Sergio Chichava English <http://bit.ly/IESE-129> and in Portuguese <http://bit.ly/IESE-129p>.

Cadernos IESE Nº 18P – "A Frelimo criou o 'Al Shabaab'?" Uma análise às eleições de 15 de Outubro de 2019 a partir de Cabo Delgado." by Sergio Chichava. Portuguese only: <http://bit.ly/IESE-18p>

## Palma scared and isolated

Palma has become a boom town, with five hotels, an air strip, and a growing number of companies servicing the gas industry. Palma is only 20 km from the Afungi peninsula gas project on a new road. But now Palma is frightened and isolated, with many fearing an insurgent attack. A 4 pm curfew is in place and some Palma residents have been issued with arms to form a militia. There are some heavily armed government special forces stationed in Palma.

The only open road out of Palma, the dirt road to Mueda via Pendanhar and Nangade, is now subject to regular attack. Five northern districts including Palma, Mueda, and Mocimboa da Praia have been without stable electricity for 10 days, apparently because insurgents are preventing EDM staff from making repairs to damaged transmission equipment, probably near Awasse. Fuel for generators has run out.

BCI and BIM both closed banks in Palma during the week and withdrew their staff. Only Standard Bank is still operating. Only the air link to Pemba is now secure and many people are trying to leave.

Palma is surrounded, although government forces have recovered Vamizi island and now have more than 50 troops based there. The tourist island is 35 km south-east of Palma, and can control coastal shipping in the area.

The Afungi gas area is 7000 ha, on a triangle approximately 11 km on each side, occupying most of the Afungi peninsula. A new 12 km road makes the gas site 20 km from the centre of Palma. The best set of updated maps and pictures is on <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/afungi-Ing-construction-site>. The best site map is the original 2012 plan, still reasonably correct, on <https://www.greencarcongress.com/2012/12/afungi-20121224.html>

## More than 2000 dead in Cabo Delgado civil war

The death toll in the Cabo Delgado civil war has reached 2074 according to Aclad, which keeps the most accurate scorecard. Its latest weekly report is on <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>. *Cabo Ligado* is the weekly joint publication of Aclad and Zitamar and MediaFax in Maputo.

*Pinnacle News*, which has some of the best reporting, now has a website (which is easier to use than their Facebook page) on <http://pinnaclenews.net/category/cabo-delgado/>. Its recent reports point to five different groups of insurgents:

- + The first is operating around Palma town and north to the Rovuma River and Tanzanian border. A paramilitary border post at Nyica on the Rovuma was attacked on 28 September with casualties on both sides. The nearby village was burned.

- + The second is operating the outskirts of Mocimboa da Praia and is strong enough to stop the military from retaking the town; this was the group that also occupied islands. Attacks there have sent people fleeing north toward Palma, with some taking refuge in the village of people resettled from Afungi.

- + To the west a group is operating between Awasse and Chai, controlling the N380 road and electricity and telecommunications. In Chai six members of the same family were decapitated in a raid on 26 September. Villages near Chai have been burned.

- + Another group is operating widely in Macomia district, promising an attack in the coming week on the district headquarters of Macomia 40 km inland, and warning local people to leave. Insurgents attacked Mucojo, Pangane and nearby villages on the coast on 30 September killing residents and burning houses. Reports yesterday (3 Oct) are that some defence force members have arrived in Mucojo.

- + A group in Quissanga district resumed attacks for the first time in three months. On 24 September Bilibiza and Cangembe were attacked and burned, killing seven. At least 700 local people fled south to Metuge. *Cabo Ligado* (29 Sep) notes: "The attack also calls into question the government's ability to maintain its security gains. Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi assured the country in a 25 September speech that state security forces had 'strongly repelled' an attack on Bilibiza, but this account is not borne out by reports from people on the ground. Instead, it seems that insurgents were able to slip in and out of an area that the government had cleared months ago with no immediate consequences. The only reported government response to the Cangembe and Bilibiza attacks came on 26 September, when helicopters operated by Dyck Advisory Group attacked suspected insurgents near Tanganhangue," 20 km east of Cangembe.

(*Pinnacle News*, VoA, Zitamar, *Cabo Ligado*)

## Chipande cattle taken

Pangane, a small town and port on the coast of Macomia, was attacked for at least the fifth time on 30 September. Many people fled to nearby forest and cane fields, or by boat. General Alberto Chipande, who fired the first shot of the independence war and who is now on the Frelimo Political Commission and a "big man" in Cabo Delgado, has a farm near Pangane with more than 100

cattle. He commissioned two local businessmen with large open lorries to take the cattle to safety in Nanjua, Ancuabe district. But along the road from Mucojo to Macomia the lorries were ambushed. One lorry was burned, but the other was used to transport an estimated 10 tonnes of goods taken in the Pangane raid. The lorry was later seen hidden in dense forest. (*Pinnacle News* 1 Oct) And Chipande's cattle? No confirmation, but probably food for the insurgents.

**Water is running short in Mueda** due to lack of electricity. (*Pinnacle News* 3 Oct)

**Ibo District Administrator Issa Satar Momade refused to abandon his post** and rejected a helicopter sent to collect him. He said it is unfair for a director to be the first to flee the town. He is the only administrator in insurgent areas to remain in his district town. (*Pinnacle News* 3 Oct)

## Other reports on Cabo Delgado

There has been extensive writing and research on Cabo Delgado:

**How the oil industry made us doubt climate change.** BBC (20 Sept) The Attorney General of the US state of Minnesota in June sued ExxonMobil, among others, for launching a "campaign of deception" which deliberately tried to undermine the science supporting global warming. The BBC investigation shows how tactics of the oil industry, led by Exxon, were similar to those used by the tobacco industry trying to dismiss the harms of smoking decades earlier. The US firm ExxonMobil is the lead company developing area 4 of the Cabo Delgado gas fields.

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-53640382> Meanwhile, Friends of the Earth will mount a legal challenge against the UK government's decision to offer \$1bn in financial support to the Total gas project (Area 1) that they say is "incompatible" with the Paris climate agreement. (Guardian, London, 7 Sept <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/sep/07/legal-challenge-uk-1bn-grant-mozambique-gas-project>)

**How did a 'cocktail of violence' engulf Mozambique's gemstone El Dorado?** Guardian, (London, 18 Sept <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/sep/18/mozambique-cabo-delgado-cocktail-of-violence-escalates-el-dorado-of-gemstones>) Excellent summary. In the absence of government services, people have lost access to the land they relied on for food, shelter and income, due to the expansion of mining and gas extraction, while being deemed unqualified for jobs in these new industries. One researcher cited to say "When they speak about the radical preacher coming to radicalise young people, they are forgetting that the government has done for the radical preacher about 80% of the job. He just comes to harvest."

**Não ao apoio militar a um Governo que despreza o povo** (No to military support to a government that despises the people, *Publico* 2 Oct). Michael Hagedorn calls on Portugal to refuse to provide military support to Mozambique. "To consider providing support - albeit only in training and logistics - to this corrupt Government and its armed forces, without first demanding full clarification of the attacks against the civilian population in Cabo Delgado, is totally unacceptable." In Portuguese: <https://www.publico.pt/2020/10/02/opiniao/opiniao/nao-apoio-militar-governo-despreza-povo-1933638>

To translate from Portuguese to English, [Deepl.com](https://www.deepl.com) is probably best at present, and is adequate to translate the Portuguese articles cited here.

**What is behind rebel attacks in Mozambique's gas-rich region?** Al Jazeera (12 Sept) In time, Mozambique will become the world's fourth-biggest exporter of gas but right now it is fast becoming the most unequal society in sub-Saharan Africa. <https://www.aljazeera.com/program/counting-the-cost/2020/9/12/what-is-behind-rebel-attacks-in-mozambiques-gas-rich-region/>

**Asymmetries in access to the state: a fertile land for the penetration of Islamic jihadism?** by João Feijó, OMR. This excellent and important paper is now available in English.

He finds unequal access to state resources and marginalisation of the poorest are behind the insurgency. High poverty rates are widespread and similar in all three ethno-linguistic groups, and the insurgency is fuelled by post-independence changes related to unequal access to state resources. "The Muani and Macua populations see the State as partisan and captured by specific ethno-linguistic groups (mostly Macondes in alliance with elements from the South)."

<https://omrmz.org/omrweb/publicacoes/or-93/>

OMRs next webinar "Desafios e experiências na construção da paz" with João Feijó will be held on 20 October from 3 to 5 pm Maputo time.

**Mozambique and Presource Curse.** A prescient article first published in 2016 in a now closed magazine, Zitamar editor Leigh Elston has reprinted it. (9 Sept) Rather than a "resource curse", Mozambique's curse has come before the resources are exploited. The expectation of gas led to the \$2 bn debt, which in turn put political and financial pressure on Mozambique. This has meant Mozambique gets a worse deal than it otherwise would from lenders and investors.

<https://zitamar.com/mozambique-and-the-presource-curse/>

**Will Mozambique end up like Nigeria or Norway?** Another prescient article, on the BBC in 2013. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22008933>

**My Cabo Delgado reports are still available. The most recent is** "Military & economic intervention". 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene> Five others are listed below.

### **In brief**

**Half the those accused of terrorism have been acquitted** by the Cabo Delgado provincial court for lack of evidence. (VOA 8 Sept) There have been 130 acquittals and 120 convictions. But many of those not guilty had been held in jail for a long time and are now being released without jobs or money.

**Heroin is still going over the border.** A truck carrying 342 kg of heroin in 250 packets with street value of \$5 mn was caught after it followed an unusual route going from Mozambique through Swaziland and then into KwaZulu-Natal. Police found a hidden compartment welded closed and then newly painted over, and had to cut through the compartment. (News24, SA Police, 10 Sept)

**Pemba Logistics Base still has no customers.** The joint venture between the opaque Italian-Nigerian oil services company Orlean Invest and ENH, Mozambique's national oil company, has been controversial and unacceptable to US authorities. It was intended to supply the offshore industry and has claimed to be ready for two years. (See this newsletter 304 and 435) Support for drilling and ENI's floating gas liquification platform will partly go through Pemba port. Anadarko and now Total will use the existing Pemba port facilities and not the new logistics base, but ENI might use the new base. (Zitamar 30 Sep)

**India's Central Bureau of Investigation looking at state-owned Bharat Petroleum Corp (BPCL) investment in the Area 1.** *Economic Times* (29 Sep) reports that Anadarko had originally offered a 20% stake in Area 1 to BPCL, but the state-owned firm bought only 10% for \$75m in August 2008, and Videocon, an Indian conglomerate, bought the other 10% stake for an equivalent sum. Videocon later sold the same stake to state-owned ONGC Videsh for \$2.5bn. *Economic Times* says the BJP-led government which took office in 2014 has been critical of the previous Congress-led government investing \$6bn in Mozambique gas, as falling oil and gas prices did not justify such huge investments.

**GMPIS - Grupo de Mulheres de Partilha de Sofala** which last year created a solidarity campaign for the victims of cyclone IDAI has started a solidarity campaign to support women and girls in Cabo Delgado: [gf.me/u/y2kj3n](https://gf.me/u/y2kj3n)

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### **Important external links**

**Cabo Delgado civil war** weekly report - Zitamar, MediaFax, ACLED - <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

**Covid-19** daily updated data and graphs <https://covidmoz.netlify.app/>

Previous editions of this newsletter: [bit.ly/MozNews2020](http://bit.ly/MozNews2020)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Other Mozambique material [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

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### **There are six special reports on the Cabo Delgado war**

Notes on the evolution of the Cabo Delgado war: Although the global should not be forgotten, the local is most important. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

How might military & economic intervention shape the war? 3 Sept 2020  
<https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

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### **Background reading**

#### **Special reports**

##### **Mozambique heroin transit trade**

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

##### **Gas for development?**

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

##### **\$2bn secret debt - in English**

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

##### **In Portuguese:**

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kq>

##### **Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>**

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

##### **Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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**Mozambique media websites, English:**

Club of Mozambique: <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar: <http://zitamar.com/>

Macauhub English: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/>

AIM Reports: [www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news](http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news)

**Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:**

Notícias: [www.jornalnoticias.co.mz](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz)

O País: [www.opais.co.mz](http://www.opais.co.mz)

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

**Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:**

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>

Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>

Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/>

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