Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s

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Many scholars of sub-Saharan Africa have argued that cultural pluralism has been a significant cause of elite conflict in the periods both before and after independence. However, the precise way in which pluralism influences conflict is open to debate. On the one hand, conflict is seen as the direct result of actual levels of support received by various factions among the elite who represent different categories of a society's citizens. On the other hand, conflict is viewed as the result of competition among elite factions for power and prestige roles within the nationalist movement or dominant political party with little or no actual support from the categories of people they claim to represent in the broader society.

Proponents of the latter view do not argue necessarily that cultural pluralism does not exist in sub-Saharan African countries, but, rather, that such cleavages are essentially used 'ideologically' by various elite factions as they vie for power and prestige. Elites may perceive cleavages as being important while members of such categories do not. As Mafeje has pointed out, there exists a real difference between the man who, on behalf of his tribe, strives to maintain its traditional integrity and autonomy, and the man who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain a power position, not in the tribal area, but in the modern capital city.

In this article it is argued that the internal conflict experienced by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) from 1962 to 1969 was primarily the

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3 FRELIMO was the result of the coalescing of three protonationalist organizations: the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO) led by Holomulo Chitofo (Adelino) Gwambe; the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) led by Matthew Mmole and
result of competition among elite factions for the highest power and status roles within the structure of the party and not a significant intrusion of pluralism into the nationalist movement as a whole. During this period, different elites used appeals to ethnic and class cleavages in an ideological manner as they vied for the relatively few high level prestige and power positions available within the FRELIMO party structure. The linkage between pluralism and elite behaviour

was their perception of the importance of regional, class, racial, and ethnolinguistic differences which were, by and large, irrelevant for the actual levels of support various factions were receiving.\textsuperscript{4}

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Of a population in Mozambique of more than eight million\textsuperscript{5} about 98 per cent are African, who fall within two main ethnolinguistic divisions. One of these covers the predominately patrilineal peoples living south of the Zambezi River. The most numerous group in this area, and the second largest in Mozambique, is the Thonga (1,460,000) who live to the south of the Save River. The Shona (1,155,000), the third largest ethnolinguistic group, are located to the north of the Thonga in the area between the Save and the Zambezi.

The second main ethnolinguistic division consists of the predominately matrilineal peoples living north of the Zambezi. Among them is found the largest ethnolinguistic group in Mozambique, the Makua-Lomwe (2,293,000) of whom the Makua make up about threequarters of its peoples and have been heavily Islamized. The Makua also make up the largest majority of the Swahili-speaking inhabitants of the coastal region north of Quelimane. The next largest ethnolinguistic group in the north, the Makonde (136,000), inhabit an isolated plateau in the north-east of Mozambique in the province of Cabo Delgado and border on Tanzania. Their geographical location, distance from foreign settlements both in Tanzania and Mozambique, and traditional distrust of outsiders has acted to preserve Makonde culture in spite of long contact with outsiders, Arabs and Europeans alike. The Yao (119,900), on the contrary, have become completely Islamized through prolonged contact with Arabs during the East African slave trade in which they acted as middlemen.\textsuperscript{6}

The valley of the Zambezi forms in effect the boundary between these two major ethnolinguistic divisions. The valley has for many centuries been an access route into Mozambique for invasions and migrations of various African peoples and there has, consequently, been a considerable mixing of peoples here so that the area exhibits a high degree of cultural heterogeneity.

The 'dysrhythmic'\textsuperscript{7} impact of Portuguese colonialism has given to southern

\textsuperscript{4} This thesis is contrary to the assessment of John Saul who argues that class cleavages were the fundamental cause of conflict within the Mozambique nationalist movement during the 1960s. See his 'FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution', \textit{Monthly Review}, 24, 1973, pp. 22–52.


ethnolinguistic groups living near Lourenço Marques and in areas adjacent to Rhodesia and South Africa a head start on northern groups in receiving the socio-economic and educational advantages provided by the impact of western colonialism. It is in this region that the non-Africans are most in evidence. Although they form only two per cent of the population—about 100,000 are Portuguese, 18,000 Indians, 2,000 Chinese, and 32,000 mestigos, or people of mixed European and African descent—a their influence has been disproportionately great and it has been felt largely by the peoples of southern Mozambique. Thus a kind of stratification has developed among the country’s Africans. Groups from the north and central regions, such as the Makonde and Yao, are considered by southerners as ‘backward’, ‘primitive’, and ‘traditional’ while groups in the south, like the Thonga, are considered by northerners to be ‘aggressive’, ‘domineering’, and ‘corrupt’. Ethnolinguistic differences are thus simplified into a perception of regional differentiation, especially between those from north of the Zambezi and those from the south. In some cases, notably among the Islamic Yao and Makua-Lomwe, religious differences exacerbate a sense of separation.

Superimposed on these fundamental cleavages was a ‘vertical’ system of stratification based upon socio-economic, educational, cultural, and racial factors. At the highest level was a small minority, perhaps 2.5 per cent of the whole population, which consisted of Portuguese, Asians, mestigos, and some assimilados, who lived in the major urban centres and were engaged in the money economy in activities such as the civil service, commerce, manufacturing, transportation, and large-scale agriculture. During the 1960s it was possible to distinguish several categories within this minority. At the top were Portuguese owners of large plantations and the various large business enterprises, top-level civil servants and military officers, and successful professionals. This group, which was well-educated and almost exclusively white, considered itself an economic, political and social elite and had a sense of identification as such. Family connections were important; members felt they knew one another; and favours in employment were often given to friends and relatives. Below them were middle level civil servants, salaried white collar employees, and small

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10 Assimilated status was theoretically to be granted to any African upon application who demonstrated that he was eighteen, employed, and able to read, write, and speak Portuguese.

11 The coup in Portugal of 25 April 1974 has resulted in fundamental political changes in Mozambique. FRELIMO formed the first independence government in June 1975, and this may well be the precursor to massive social changes. During the period with which this article deals, however, stratification was a real and important phenomenon.

farmers, who could be thought of as a 'middle class'. Although they were by and large white, many members were mestigos and a few were assimilados. Finally, the lowest level of this minority consisted almost entirely of assimilados who worked as skilled or semi-skilled wage-earners.13

The middle stratum in the social structure of Mozambique was a second small minority, perhaps 3.5 per cent of the population; these were the recently 'detribalized' Africans who had migrated to and lived permanently on the peripheries of the major urban centres such as Lourenço Marques and Beira. Most were young men who virtually had cut their ties with the traditional societies of the rural areas and abandoned the subsistence economy to live by wage labour.14 The lowest level of the system of stratification in Mozambique was the vast bulk of the population, the 94 per cent of unacculturated, uneducated, and poor Africans living primarily in the subsistence economy.15

The hierarchical social structure of Mozambique was the result of a colonial system which made distinctions among individuals on the basis of education, race, wealth, and culture. The Portuguese missão civilizadora required Africans to divest themselves of what the colonisers considered to be their 'inferior' culture and all Africans not officially recognized as assimilados were classified as indígenas (natives). This latter status was to be legally without citizenship and civil rights. In 1961, when the regime do indígenato (native system) was abolished, only about seven thousand had been allowed to change their status even though perhaps as many as 250,000 had the qualifications.16 For Africans granted assimilated status, there was the theoretic freedom to advance in any endeavour but in reality Portuguese racialism, the assimilados' still comparatively low levels of education and the relative paucity of economic and political opportunities militated against any widespread social or economic mobility. Mestigos, by contrast, because of their mixed parentage were automatically considered to be assimilated and their colour gave them an ascriptive advantage in the competition for the relatively scarce educational and socio-economic opportunities available.

This pyramidal social structure has tended to produce among Mozambicans a general readiness to perceive the finest of distinctions among themselves. Unacculturated Africans inclined to see both assimilados and mestigos as representing Portuguese domination, while the assimilados contrasted themselves with the mestigos who were seen as its direct agents. These varied perceptions added another dimension to distinctions between northern and southern ethnolinguistic groups. It was these distinctions, together with personality clashes and genera-

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14 This categorization oversimplifies the complexity of the social situation, in that many Mozambicans 'commuted' between the rural areas and the urban areas, but there is no reliable information on their numbers. Many others worked in South Africa.
15 Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Promoção Social, passim.
FRELIMO in the 1960s

Almost before the ink was dry on the document signed in 1962 which created FRELIMO, there were signs of internal conflict. A number of expulsions from the Central Committee in the first year marked the beginning of a series of schisms, revolts, and assassinations as elite factions competed for control of the party and its highest prestige and power positions. Over the 1962–69 period the general picture is that middle-educated assimilados predominately from ethnolinguistic groups located in the central and northern districts of the country, primarily Nyanja, Makua-Lomwe, and Makonde, opposed more highly educated mestizos and assimilados largely from ethnolinguistic groups located in the southern districts, especially the Shangana, for positions of authority within the movement. Although ideological, age, and personality differences played their part, the perception of the importance of ethnolinguistic, regional, class, and racial cleavages in the home society and their use ideologically in elite competition were in large measure responsible for the pattern of internal conflict within FRELIMO and violence during the 1960s.

The scope for using such divisions in building up alliances of support within the leadership is suggested by the heterogeneous nature of the highest levels within FRELIMO. Eduardo Mondlane, the president, was born of a chiefly family in Gaza province in the extreme south of Mozambique, attended the Universities of Witwatersrand and Lisbon, and then studied in the United States, receiving his BA from Oberlin and his PhD from Northwestern. Uria Simango, FRELIMO’s vice-president, was a protestant pastor from the north of Mozambique and Marcelino dos Santos, the secretary of external affairs, was a mestizo from the northern coastal town of Lumbo. The Central Committee ranged in age from the 60 year old Lázaro Kavandame, who was a Makonde and a regional organiser, to Jorges Rebelo, a law student barely half his age.¹⁷

Immediately after FRELIMO’s First Congress, Mondlane returned to New York to complete his teaching contract at Syracuse University. Within a

month of his departure, FRELIMO experienced its first schism. In August 1962 Matthew Mmole, the president of the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), and its secretary-general, Lawrence M. Millinga, were expelled from FRELIMO by the Central Committee. The expulsion of Mmole and Millinga was the first example of ethnolinguistic differences being used ideologically in the competition for high level party positions. MANU had been organized around Makonde tribesmen from Mozambique living and working in Tanzania and consequently they comprised a substantial number of the ordinary membership of FRELIMO during the initial stages of the organization. Makonde leaders, such as Mmole and Millinga, neither of whom had been elected to the Central Committee, charged that the Makonde were being used by FRELIMO as ordinary rank-and-file troops without proportional representation in the upper level of the party. When Mmole and Millinga were expelled from FRELIMO, they claimed that leaders from southern ethnic groups were responsible for this situation because they had taken the highest positions within the party for themselves. After their departure, however, there was no significant exodus of Makonde from the movement in sympathy. Not for the last time, it was clear that leaders did not necessarily receive widespread support from the ethnolinguistic groups they claimed to represent and whose interests they purported to advance.

Two other cleavages which were used ideologically in elite competition early on were Mozambique’s racial and regional differences and involved Leo Milas who had been elected in absentia as FRELIMO’s first publicity secretary and was later to become secretary for defence and security. Milas was sent by Mondlane from the United States to Dar es Salaam, probably to attempt to quash the animosity that had developed among some Central Committee members concerning the presence in FRELIMO of Marcelino dos Santos, a highly educated mestigo, and his election to the position of secretary of external affairs. Resentful and suspicious of dos Santos because he was a mestigo, some black Mozambicans, primarily from ethnic groups situated in the central and northern regions, charged that dos Santos was not a Mozambican at all but a Cape Verdian and should, therefore, be expelled from the party.

Milas’s presence only made the situation worse because questions had been raised about his identity ever since his nomination by Mondlane during the First Congress. There were accusations that he was an agent of the American Central Intelligence Agency who had been sent to Dar es Salaam to gather information on FRELIMO. Mondlane, who had made Milas’ acquaintance in the United States, was reluctant to investigate these charges for fear of exacerbating an already delicate situation. Consequently Milas was seen by his detractors as an agent of the party leadership because by that time blacks from northern and central ethnolinguistic groups perceived the movement as dominated by mestigos and assimilados from southern groups. In December 1962 Milas was beaten up.

18 Frente Unida Anti-imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique (FUNIPAMO), Memoranda Supporting Declaration of Dissolution of FRELIMO, Kampala, mimeographed, 27 May 1963.
by about twenty suspicious FRELIMO members. A month later, in January 1963, David Mabunda, FRELIMO’s secretary-general, Paulo Gumane, his deputy, João Mungwambe, the organizing secretary, and Manual G. Mahluza, the movement’s representative in Cairo, were expelled from the Central Committee because of their alleged involvement in the beating.19

These expulsions did not, however, reduce suspicions concerning Milas’ identity. Consequently, while on a trip to New York, Mondlane, with the aid of a private detective agency, investigated Milas’ background which revealed that he was in fact a black American called Leo Clinton Aldridge, who had taken an MA degree in Romance Languages at the University of Southern California. Milas was expelled in August 1964 from the party after which he went to Khartoum, where he added Seifak-Aziz to his name, denounced FRELIMO, and began issuing pro-Chinese anti-FRELIMO propaganda in the name of the defunct Mozambique African National Union.20

Another event which intensified the perception that regional, ethnolinguistic, and racial cleavages were being infused into the nationalist movement was the death in October 1966 of Filipe Magaia, FRELIMO’s secretary of defence and a northerner. Immediately following his death, the Central Committee announced that Magaia had been killed in action against Portuguese forces inside Mozambique, and that Samora Móises Machel, then the commander of the Kongwa military camp and a southerner from the Shangana, would be appointed to the post of secretary of defence. The black groups from the north and central regions perceived Magaia’s death, which they blamed on the mestizo and assimilated African leaders from southern tribes, and Machel’s appointment, as a ploy to continue dominating the party by denying them one more major leadership position. They charged that Machel’s appointment was ‘unconstitutional’, believing Magaia’s logical successor to be Casal Ribeiro, the deputy secretary of defence, and, like Magaia, a northerner.21

20 Marcum, ‘Three Revolutions’; Mozambique Revolution, Dar es Salaam, No. 9, p. 4. In an interview in February 1972 Milas claimed to have been born in Inhambane in Mozambique in 1934, the son of a Shangana mother named Milasi (hence Milas) and a Zulu father. He said his family was ‘politically active’. Milas claimed to have received primary education in Mozambique and secondary education in Swaziland. He not only admits attending the University of Southern California but also the University of California, Los Angeles. After his expulsion from FRELIMO, he claims to have operated for a short time with a military unit in Cabo Delgado under the MANU banner aided by other dissatisfied FRELIMO members. After Khartoum, he went to Addis Ababa where at the time of the interview he had lived for four years. For some time he taught at Halle Sellassie I University and was later news editor of The Ethiopian Herald, and a programme organizer for the Voice of the Gospel radio station. He has done freelance journalism. See, for example, Leo Milas, ‘Portugal’s African Vietnam’, The Ethiopian Herald, February 25 1972. See also his ‘Mozambique Liberation’, Spearhead, December 1962, pp. 21–22, written while he was FRELIMO’s secretary for information.
21 Mbule asserts that Mondlane, dos Santos, and Machel were responsible for Magaia’s murder and the appointment of Machel. He claims this unleashed a ‘reign of terror’ throughout FRELIMO with those who supported Magaia being killed if they opposed Machel’s appointment. According
By late 1967 and early 1968 mutual distrust and hostility between these two factions had become so intense that violence broke out between them. The first manifestation of this violence occurred at the secondary school operated by the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam which was convulsed by a student revolt in March 1968. Before 1967 a significant aspect of the FRELIMO programme involved the training of the administrative cadres that would be needed in the post-independence period. This training was accomplished at the Mozambique Institute's secondary school and through study abroad. However, in 1967 the Central Committee, realizing that military operations would have to be increased to overcome Portuguese resistance, decided to de-emphasize academic preparation and stress military training. Students at the Institute's secondary school, many of whom believed that they had been recruited solely to study, refused to accept military training. On 5 March the dispute between the Central Committee and the students came to a climax when the students went on strike and a riot broke out. With the aid of the Tanzanian police, the Central Committee closed the school and sent half of the student body to Rutambe settlement while the other half left for Kenya. Eventually most of those sent to Rutambe slipped away for Nairobi.

A commission, appointed by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity and the Tanzanian government, determined that the student revolt was the 'direct consequence of the interference in the affairs of the Institute by Father Mateus Gwenjere'. Gwenjere, an African Catholic priest, had joined FRELIMO at the end of 1967, bringing with him a number of students from the junior seminary in Beira where he taught. He immediately exploited the already latent distrust and animosity between the students, the bulk of whom came from the northern and central regions, and the Central Committee. This was achieved by encouraging the students to expect scholarships for further study abroad, by demanding that the medium of instruction be English rather than Portuguese, and by seeking the removal from the Institute's staff of four expatriate Portuguese teachers and the director, Janet Mondlane, all of whom were white. He convinced the students that the new policy requiring military service was another ploy by southern mestizos and assimilado leaders to eliminate from the party blacks from ethnic groups from the northern and central regions, especially those to an anonymous source, however, Magaia was actually murdered at Nachingwea by a man reportedly dissatisfied with his leadership. This 'dissatisfaction with leadership' probably involved infidelities on the part of the man's wife and Magaia. Mbule, _Petition Presented to the OAU_, p. 7; Chilambe, 'The Struggle in Mozambique', p. 6; and Miguel Artur Murupa, _Statement to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania_, Dar es Salaam, typescript, February (?), n.d. Mbule and Murupa both charge FRELIMO with Magaia's death. Murupa says he was 'shot with a pistol in the stomach, on orders of the Gaza clique, by Lourenço Matola ... while crossing Chitanganwe River in Niassa Province ...' (p. 2).  


23 Hawley, _Refugees in Kenya_, p. 6. The most dissatisfied of this group were those who had been sent abroad to study and had returned to Dar es Salaam. They believed that FRELIMO was not adequately utilizing their newly acquired skills and expertise.

training for future leadership positions. In spite of Gwenjere's role in this student revolt, there is no evidence that he was receiving wide support from blacks from northern ethnic groups. A late-comer to the movement and an extremely ambitious man, Gwenjere was undoubtedly motivated by his desire to take over the directorate of the Institution.25

This episode draws attention to another, and growing, cause of division among the leading figures of FRELIMO, the perception of hierarchical differentiation within the movement. This perception was based on the different lifestyles of the leadership and rank-and-file members, the latter of whom lived in camps and crowded dormitories while the former had houses or lived in inexpensive hotels. During the early days of the movement, the leadership frequently made trips to international capitals and to the United Nations headquarters in New York and, when in Dar es Salaam, were often seen in bars and restaurants with visiting officials, newsmen, and diplomats.26 When the leadership, which was perceived by the students not only to be dominated by mestícos and assimilados from the south but also 'corrupt' in their backsliding over scholarship promises, asked students primarily from northern ethnic groups to do military service, it is hardly surprising that they refused. The belief that they would become cannon fodder for the southern leadership was fairly widely held.27

The second outbreak of violence within the movement occurred in May 1968 when a group of Makonde marched on the FRELIMO office in Dar es Salaam. After forcing Una Simango, then FRELIMO's vice-president, and dos Santos to surrender the keys of the building, the office was closed and the keys turned over to the Tanzanian police. A few days later another group of about twenty men, armed with clubs and pangas, once again invaded the office which in the meantime had been reopened. In the confrontation which followed, five people were injured, three of whom ended up in hospital with one of these dying later as a result of his wounds. A number of people were arrested by the Tanzanian police and the office was closed pending an investigation by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity.28

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25 Private Communication. See also Saul, 'FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution', pp. 34-5.
28 Meisler, 'Mozambique Rebels Disagree'; Mbule, Petition Presented to the OAU, p. 8 says the wounded in hospital were: Judas Sindi, Vicente and Mateus Muthemba, Mateus Muthemba dying later. Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO's security officer, was apparently hurt but did not enter hospital. The Central Committee in Os Graves Acontecimentos de 1966 e as Divergências Ideológicas, Dar es Salaam, mimeographed, 1969 p. 3, blames Gwenjere for this attack.
In July 1968 FRELIMO held its second Congress in the Niassa province of Mozambique. To the foreign observers invited to attend, the Congress not surprisingly gave the impression that FRELIMO was indeed a unified and united organization. However, this impression, while broadly true, concealed a new conflict within the leadership. During the pre-Congress planning stages, a dispute had arisen between Mondlane and Lázaro Kavandame, FRELIMO's provincial secretary for Cabo Delgado, over the site of the Second Congress. Mondlane wanted the Congress held inside Mozambique to demonstrate FRELIMO's capacity to provide a safe heaven for the meeting. Kavandame, who belonged to an old fairly well-to-do Makonde rural family, wanted the Congress held in Tanzania where he apparently enjoyed the support of certain middle-level leaders of the Tanganyika African National Union. Kavandame and a small coterie of followers believed that Mondlane wanted to hold the Congress inside Mozambique to assure his own re-election as president and other northerners were even convinced that Mondlane would use force to continue his leadership of the party. Kavandame, however, wanted the Congress held in Tanzania where his support was strongest and where he would gain the maximum advantage in the competition for the leadership. When the Congress was finally held inside Mozambique as Mondlane wished, Kavandame refused to attend. To make it appear to outsiders that the leadership was united, FRELIMO had Kavandame detained by the Tanzanian government on a pretext, to make it appear that his absence was not by his own choice.

Almost a year later, in April 1969, Kavandame defected to the Portuguese, reportedly with a suitcase full of classified FRELIMO documents, and accused the Central Committee of the exploitation of the Makonde people by its southern leadership. As Mmole and Millinga before him, Kavandame charged that few upper-level leadership positions within the party were held by Makondes in spite of the fact that they comprised a significant number of rank-and-file. Kavandame's charge, however, was little more than opportunism and an effort to appear more useful to the Portuguese then he actually was. For some time before his defection he had been involved in economic aggrandizement by skimming off surpluses from FRELIMO's commercial structures in Cabo Delgado for himself and a small group of immediate followers. At the time of his defection, the Central Committee was moving to bring the situation under control. Some time


30 For example, Mbule, Petition Presented to the OAU p. 9, says that the fears of the Kavandame group were '... born out as there was an armed group under the command of Mr Mabote which had instructions to act if Dr Mondlane was not re-elected'. Oscar Kambona, who was born in Mozambique, was the most important member of TANU supporting Kavandame.

31 Private Communication. Events suggest that Kavandame's appreciation of his Tanzanian support was also misplaced. On the Second Congress, see Basil Davidson, 'Africa After Salazar', West Africa, Nos. 2678 and 2679, September 28 and October 5, 1968, pp. 1125 and 1169, respectively; and 'In the Portuguese Context', in Christopher Allen and R. W. Johnson (eds.), African Perspectives, Cambridge 1970, pp. 329–345.

later, the Portuguese launched a propaganda drive among the Makonde, using appeals by Kavandame to lay down their arms and return home. Few Makonde responded. Like Gwenjere before him, Kavandame had little influence and support among the ethnic group he claimed to represent. But, like Gwenjere, he had tried to use appeals to ethnic solidarity and discrimination to advance his own position.

Before Kavandame was to defect, however, an untimely event took place which precipitated a number of major schisms among the FRELIMO leadership. On 3 February 1969 Mondlane was killed by an explosion from a bomb concealed in a hollowed-out book which he had received in the mail. Mondlane's assassination intensified suspicions between the two leadership factions and charges and countercharges were lodged, each group accusing the other of his murder.

Following Mondlane's death, a triumvirate was formed called the Presidential Council, consisting of Simango, dos Santos, and Machel. In April 1969 the Central Committee met for eleven days at Nachingwea to discuss the leadership crisis in the party. During these meetings, Simango's name was connected with Mondlane's assassination and Silveiro Nungu, FRELIMO's administrative secretary, who was responsible for the mail, was arrested and taken into Mozambique. Later in June FRELIMO announced that he had died while on a hunger strike. Simango and other members from ethnic groups in the northern and central regions maintained that Nungu had been murdered by the southern mestigos and assimilado leaders.

On 4 November 1969 Simango, in a statement to the press, protested about...
the poor treatment of the ordinary soldiers in the movement, claimed that increasing defections and desertions were due to tribalism, regionalism, and racialism, and accused dos Santos, Machel, and Janet Mondlane of Nungu's death. On the following day President Nyerere met the three members of the Presidential Council hoping to reconcile them. On 6 November the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity also tried its hand at reconciliation, but it, too, was unsuccessful. On 9 November Simango was suspended from the Presidential Council. Finally, on 19 February 1970, after attempting to launch a rival nationalist organization, he was declared a persona non grata by the Tanzanian government and ordered to leave the country within forty-eight hours. A reshuffling of the Central Committee resulted in Machel becoming president and dos Santos vice-president.

The schisms, expulsions, and resignations among the leadership during this period from 1962 to 1969 produced a number of rival nationalist parties. These parties, however, were never more than paper organizations and had no significant following or support. In 1962, when Gwambe was expelled from Tanzania, after his departure from FRELIMO, he organized the Comité Secreto de Restauração da UDENAMO in Kampala. Some time later he reformed UDENAMO under the name União Democrática Nacional de Monomotapa (UNDENAMO-Monomotapa). The expulsion of Mmole, Millinga, Gumane, and Mabunda in 1962 led to the formation of the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO-Mocambique) in Cairo by Gumane and Mabunda with MANU being reorganized by Mmole and Millinga. In Kampala in May 1963 UNDENAMO-Monomotapa, MANU, and the Mozambique African National Congress (MANCE) under Sebastene Sigauki came together to form the Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique (FUNIPAMO). Additional FRELIMO expulsions led to the creation of the Mozambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO) in early 1964. Later, in June of that year, MORECO, UDENAMO-Moçambique, MANU, and UNDENAMO-Monomotapa coalesced to form a new party called the Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) which was based in Lusaka and had a foreign office in Cairo. Among the approximately 400 Mozambican refugees in Kenya a modicum of political organization took place,


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primarily among the students who left the Mozambique Institute in 1968. In March 1971 old members of the Mozambique Liberation Front (MOLIMO), a defunct earlier effort at organizing Mozambican refugees in Nairobi, formed a new organization called the Frente Unida de Moçambique (FUMO). A provisional committee was established to administer and conduct the affairs of the organization.39

COREMO was the only rival organization that presented any serious challenge to FRELIMO's dominance of the nationalist movement before the coup in Portugal of 25 April 1974. Like FRELIMO, however, COREMO also experienced schisms and leadership quarrels. For example, early on its national plenipotentiary secretary, Zarica Sakupwanya, found himself in trouble with the Zambian authorities and was expelled from the party. Gwambe, the first president, was expelled in 1966, after which he formed another paper organization called the Partido Popular de Moçambique (PAPOMO). In May 1966 COREMO was reformed and Gumane was elected president. In 1968 a splinter group from COREMO established the União Nacionalista Africana de Rombêzia (UNAR) in Blantyre with the aim of the unification of Rombêzia, the area between the Rovuma and Zambezi rivers. There were reports that UNAR was linked to a group of Portuguese settlers in Mozambique who had organized for a Southern Rhodesian type UDI. According to those reports, the settler group was headed by Jorge Jardim, the editor of Noticias de Beira and linked to the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the Portuguese financier António Champalimaud, who owned that newspaper.40

COREMO criticized FRELIMO for excessive expenditures of resources on non-military activities and for trying to occupy territory in Mozambique at the cost of excessive casualties. COREMO's strategy was to infiltrate party militants trained in guerrilla warfare into Mozambique who were to organize local político-military units and clandestinely prepare for an uprising at some future date selected by the party leadership. In August 1971 a meeting was held in Lusaka between COREMO and Simango, who had since his expulsion from Tanzania drifted between Cairo, the United States, and Zambia; at this meeting the possibility of working together was explored. At the close of the conference their forces were declared united and the Simango group became members of the executive of COREMO.41

This public expression of unity did not disguise the fact that FRELIMO continued to be by far the most active and significant party in the African quest for an independent Mozambique. Its leadership, which had survived the tumultuous and sometimes violent internal politics of the 1960s did not see their ultimate control of the party as based upon ethnolinguistic or regional factors. Their language referred not to geographical discrimination but to nationalist and even class distinctions. Aware that the political structures inside Mozambique had not developed to keep pace with the expansion of the fighting, they realized that the increase in the level of hostilities called for a shift from structures designed for political mobilization to those suitable for combat operations. This required increased centralization which was resisted by men such as Kavandame who were representative of 'petty bourgeois nationalism' and acted with considerable autonomy and independence.

The successful elite faction came to believe that FRELIMO had been tolerating two divergent ideologies within itself. One was characterized by the belief in the principles of the popular mobilization of the masses in a prolonged struggle in which victory was assured by history. The other ideology, so they thought, was essentially opposed to the prolonged war strategy and engagement of the popular masses and was associated with the petty bourgeois class represented by the black groups from north and central regions of the country. This dual, and contradictory, ideology had been allowed to exist because Mondlane had been overly tolerant of diverse opinions and interests. After the expulsion of Simango and others, however, the new leadership believed that the class cleavage had been eliminated from the party with one ideology prevailing. As they put it, this ideology was

seated in the principle that our struggle is, in the last analysis, a struggle between the interests of the oppressed working classes of Mozambique and the oppressor class, foreign or domestic. . . . The CC (Central Committee) reaffirms that FRELIMO, vanguard of the Mozambican people, will prosecute without difficulty the armed revolutionary struggle of National Liberation against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism as well as against the exploitive capitalist and reactionary forces that exist among the Mozambican population.

This analysis, too, was probably more representative of the eye of the beholder than of the real perceptions of Mozambicans. It is doubtful whether Simango and the other central committee members who resigned at the time of his expulsion from the party received widespread support from 'exploitive capitalist and reac-

Newsletter, No. 2, April 1972. The Newsletter covering page gives the following membership of the COREMO executive: Paulo Gumane, president; Absolom Bahule, general secretary; Rev. Uria T. Simango, secretary of external affairs; Imanuel Mahuza, secretary of defence and security; Samuel Simango, administrative secretary; Dr. Arcanjo F. Kambeu, secretary of information; Bernardo Forte, secretary of social affairs; Francisco Mário, secretary of health; Judas Honwana, deputy secretary of information responsible for youth; and Lourenço Mutaca, secretary for special duties. Kambeu, Honwana, and Mutaca were Simango's colleagues.

FRELIMO, Os Graves Acontecimentos . . . .
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
FRELIMO in the 1960s

The nature of the forces within Mozambique. The truth of the matter seems to be that competition within the elite was structured without much direct connection with popular feelings, and each side buttressed their own positions with appeals to one sort of ideology or another, the losing factions normally to ethnolinguistic discrimination, the victorious group to nationalist and class rhetoric.

IV

With the exception of COREMO, which initially attracted a fairly substantial following of dissatisfied Africans from northern ethnolinguistic groups, the tumultuous events of the 1960s did not result in the formation of viable, alternative nationalist movements drawing significant support from groups within the home society. In most cases the alternative organizations formed by dissatisfied elites had little substance beyond the paper on which their constitutions were written. Even Kavandame's efforts to dominate the movement and later, after his defection, to woo Makonde tribesmen away from FRELIMO to the Portuguese side were unsuccessful, indicating little support among the Makonde for his leadership. On the whole, then, the schisms and expulsions of this period occurred almost exclusively among elites and did not involve large numbers of followers from the various categories they claimed to represent. In other words, the dissident leaders used pluralism ideologically.

This elite conflict of the 1960s was the result of the special circumstances in which FRELIMO found itself. Independence seemed remote; the Portuguese control of Mozambique was backed with overwhelming force and apparent determination; the movement had to survive outside the home society or, even more precariously, in the perilous environment of an 'occupied' country; and there were relatively few power and prestige positions available within the movement for men of ability. Under these circumstances, FRELIMO provided the sole structure in which Mozambique's exiled political elites could appropriately compete. This tended to focus elite conflict within FRELIMO and intensified perceived differences among factions. In a sense, the politics of the movement became a zero-sum game, with cultural pluralism providing the major perceptions and categories which elites, especially those in the minority, used as they competed for the scarce economic and political resources available within the liberation movement as a whole.

The achievement of independence in June 1975 introduces a quite different situation. The greater availability of positions of power and prestige, within government and also within the economic and social spheres, will lessen the likelihood of the intense conflict of the 1960s. The euphoria of success will replace the frustration of limited progress. Nevertheless, the recollection of past differences may well continue to foster some elite conflict and, if the class analysis of elite divisions is valid, further conflict, although of a different kind, is
While elite conflict is an ever present possibility, as the experiences of many African countries have shown, the crucial question relates to the connection between the ordinary people of Mozambique and the elites. If the pluralism which was used ideologically in the 1960s comes to represent the perceptions and loyalties of the majority of Mozambicans, the optimism with which Mozambique sets out on its independence may be misplaced. On the other hand, FRELIMO triumphed in spite of the appeals made by its opponents in the name of pluralism. And more optimistically, it could be argued that the social cohesion of post-independence Mozambique will be strengthened by the integrating experience of military conflict and its ultimate conclusion in political victory over the Portuguese.

45 Since the cease fire took effect in August 1974, a number of African political groups sprang up to challenge FRELIMO's dominance of the political scene. Although many are defunct, five came together to form a united party called the Partido de Coligação (PCN) located in Beira. PCN's president was Uria Simango and vice-president was Paulo Gumane, both of COREMO. Joana Simião, a one-time COREMO member and the past vice-president of the now moribund Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUMO), and Mbule of FUMO were important members of the PCN executive committee. See Portugal Hoje, Lisbon, No. 17, 31 August 1974.