


João M. Cabrita

MOZAMBIQUE
The Tortuous Road to
Democracy



1

Marriage of Convenience

In the relatively short existence of Portugal as a Republic, the Armed Forces intervened in the country's political affairs twice. After the monarchy fell in 1910, Portugal entered a period of political instability, which over the next 16 years saw 44 changes of government (an average of three governments every year), eight presidents and 20 uprisings.¹ This prompted the Armed Forces to stage a coup in May 1926. Ultimately, the coup led to a Fascist dictatorship, which ruled Portugal for nearly 50 years, first under Antonio Salazar, and then, upon his departure for health reasons in 1968, by Marcello Caetano.

The Armed Forces support for the regime which stemmed from the 1926 coup was unquestionable, save the occasional signs of dissatisfaction, which the loyalists suppressed. The situation changed when the Portuguese government, faced with a war in three of its African colonies, called upon the Armed Forces to play a more active role in the defense of what the regime saw as a 'multicontinental nation', stretching from Minho in northern Portugal, to Timor in Asia. Rather than being confined to barracks or used in extraneous governmental tasks, the Armed Forces were suddenly faced with a new reality altogether. Owing to their direct contact with the colonial wars, the Armed Forces began to change their perception of nationhood.

As the wars gained momentum, it became clear that the Armed Forces were heading for a collapse. Portugal's position had become critical in Guinea-Bissau where Amilcar Cabral's PAIGC guerrillas had made great inroads. Yet, the Portuguese government refused to consider a political settlement because it believed that that would inevitably pave the way to the crumbling of its empire. As Prime Minister Caetano told General Antonio de Spínola, then Guinea-Bissau's governor general and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces stationed there, he would prefer a

withdrawal through an honorable military defeat than an agreement with terrorists.²

For the Armed Forces, the longer they stayed in Africa, the greater the chance of being caught in a quagmire, with humiliating consequences. This they were not prepared to let happen, especially after the 1961 events in Portuguese India. The Salazar regime preferred to sacrifice Portugal's military presence in Goa, Damao and Diu than to submit to the sovereignty demands of India. In their view, the Portuguese Armed Forces, as an elite institution, were being threatened by the stubbornness of the country's politicians. The regime's continuation, which the Armed Forces had propped up for the last 48 years, was no longer a viable proposition. Thus, the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) brought down the Caetano government on 25 April 1974.

Initially, the new Portugal was divided into three factions. One was embodied in General Spínola's call for a Lusophone federation. The second was for the colonies' immediate independence so as to permit Portugal's integration into the European Union. The third, Marxist-oriented MFA officers, merely wanted power transferred to the nationalist organizations of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. In the ensuing power struggle, a younger generation of officers gained the upper hand, thwarting Spínola's neocolonial alternative.

The colonial crisis was settled in the traditionally undemocratic manner of Portuguese institutions, of which the apparently progressive MFA was an integral part. After all, the genesis of the MFA had not been ideological, but classist in the sense that its leaders were brought together by a dispute over promotions. Without a sufficient officer corps to lead the colonial wars, the Caetano government decided to promote non-career officers over professional soldiers, causing unrest and dissatisfaction within the military establishment.

No arrangements were made to ensure a democratic basis for the future African countries. Power was transferred to the nationalists, who were regarded as the authentic representatives of the people, a claim based on their years of fighting for independence.

In Mozambique's case, power was transferred to the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Frelimo), under the terms of the Lusaka Accord of 7 September 1974. The accord had been partially negotiated between MFA and Frelimo officials without the knowledge of the Portuguese president, and the foreign minister, Mario Soares. Spínola was unaware that the MFA issued orders to the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique to disengage from operations against Frelimo and withdraw. Other groups were excluded from independence negotiations because

the MFA regarded them as either puppets or last-minute opportunists, although no political opposition had been allowed in Portugal and in the colonies during the deposed regime. Coremo, or *Comite Revolucionario de Mozambique*, a Frelimo dissident guerrilla movement, was not invited to the peace talks. On 25 June 1975, the colony became the People's Republic of Mozambique. No provisions were made for elections.

The formation of Frelimo was announced for the first time in Accra on 29 May 1962 by the *Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mozambique* (Udenamo) and the *Mozambique African National Union* (MANU).³ For several months, the two organizations of exiled Mozambicans had been holding unity talks in their Tanzania base. A third organization, the *Uniao Nacional Democratica de Mozambique Independente* (Unami), joined before Frelimo's official debut in Dar es Salaam in June 1962. It was more a marriage of convenience imposed on the Mozambicans than a genuine united front against Portuguese colonialism, ultimately contributing to divisions within the colony's independence movement. Interference by African governments with different agendas for continental issues had been a determining factor in the marriage.

Formed in Rhodesia in November 1960, Udenamo was the first of the three Mozambican independence movements to advocate violence to bring about independence. Udenamo was influenced by Zimbabwean politics, and its members had a history of involvement with Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party. Adelino Gwambe, a 20-year-old Mozambican from Inhambane, led the organization. As a campaign for the independence of Mozambique could not be waged from white-ruled Rhodesia, Gwambe and his followers left for Tanzania, where, in view of its forthcoming independence, Udenamo would be better positioned to wage an armed campaign against the Portuguese.

Once based in Dar es Salaam, Udenamo continued to attract Mozambicans. In April 1961, Udenamo's vice-president, Fanuel Mahluza, wrote to Eduardo Mondlane, a US educated Mozambican anthropologist working for the UN Trusteeship Council in New York, inviting him to join the organization. Mondlane did not accept the invitation. He had his own agenda, which did not conform to Udenamo's. Mondlane, who had established close links with the Kennedy administration, had just completed a tour of Mozambique, where, in addition to the red-carpet treatment accorded to him by a Portuguese government eager to win him over, he saw that nationalist sentiment was strong.

During a two-day meeting at the State Department in Washington, DC in May, Mondlane gave a full account of his February-March 1961

stay in Mozambique.⁴ Although Mondlane had successfully applied in 1960 to be transferred from the UN Trusteeship Council to the Addis Ababa-based Economic Commission for Africa, he now wanted the United States to locate a non-UN position for him, which would permit him to support his family while carrying on nationalist activities, and to give him funds to operate a nationalist organization that would seek a non-violent solution in Mozambique. Mondlane was concerned over the possibility of a war being waged from Tanzania because, as he put it in a report on his Mozambique tour given to US Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, 'one shudders at the consequences of such an eventuality, judging by Portugal's reaction to a similar situation in Angola'. Mondlane suggested in his report that the

United States should be in a position to encourage Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination for the African peoples under her control; set target dates and take steps towards self-government and independence by 1965; and help formulate and finance policies of economic, educational, and political development for the people of Portuguese Africa and to prepare them for an independence with responsibility.⁵

Mondlane struck a favourable chord in the State Department. In a note to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy at the White House, Bowles described Mondlane as 'a moderate person with the potential for top leadership in Mozambique'.⁶ Reporting on the May meeting at the State Department, William Wight, Jr, the deputy director of the East African Division in the Department, noted that Mondlane 'seemed genuinely friendly to the United States and genuinely desirous of seeking a non-violent solution in Mozambique if such a thing were possible'.⁷

Mondlane not only saw himself as leader of Mozambique's independence cause, but also the unifying force of all anti-Portuguese liberation movements, although an organization seeking that goal had already been established in Casablanca in April 1961 as the Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas, CONCP.

During another meeting at the State Department in February 1962, Mondlane said he did not regard the ideological schisms within the various nationalist movements opposed to Portugal as a stumbling block for his overall plan. He knew Mario de Andrade, a leading member of Angola's MPLA movement, from his student days in Portugal as a non-communist. The other MPLA members as well as the PAIGC were, as he put it, 'salvageable' from their communist stance.⁸

This view differed from that of Marcelino dos Santos who had joined Udenamo in April 1961. A 32-year-old Mozambican mulatto,⁹ Marcelino dos Santos studied electronic engineering in Lisbon. There he came into contact with students from other Portuguese colonies, notably Lucio Lara and Agostinho Neto of Angola, as well as Rui Nazare and Orlando Costa, two intellectuals from India, who, he admits, had a profound influence on his political thinking. His stay in Portugal was cut short after quarrelling with a Portuguese lecturer during a test. Marcelino dos Santos left for France in 1951 to continue his studies, but then changed to political science. He moved not only in French leftist circles, but in Eastern bloc countries as well. In 1953 he attended the Bucharest youth festival, and in the following year visited China where he met Chou En Lai. In 1955 he traveled to Warsaw for another youth festival. He was in Moscow for the 1957 World Youth Festival, causing a row with the Portuguese Communist Party delegation whom he accused of consisting of agents of the Portuguese political police, the PIDE.¹⁰ Marcelino dos Santos was expelled from France in January 1960, claiming the French had acted at the request of PIDE. He moved to Morocco, becoming involved in the preparations for the founding of CONCP. In that capacity, he invited Gwambe to represent Udenamo at the CONCP's founding conference.

Gwambe's decision to appoint Marcelino dos Santos there and then as Udenamo's deputy secretary general undoubtedly provided the organization with its most capable intellectual and organizer, but also with a dedicated Stalinist. His appointment was to have far-reaching consequences not only in the subsequent armed struggle against the Portuguese, but also in independent Mozambique. It was Marcelino dos Santos who drafted Udenamo's constitution, structuring it under the principles of 'democratic centralism'.

As Udenamo expanded its links further afield, its leaders saw signs of uneasiness on the part of their hosts. Tanzania's Julius Nyerere government was concerned over the organization's links with Ghana, established through the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs when Udenamo operated from Rhodesia. Ghana, the first country to assist Udenamo financially, extended regular invitations for the organization's senior officials to visit Accra. It funded Gwambe's visits to Conakry and Helsinki, and provided an office for the Udenamo representative in Accra. The Tanzanians viewed Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah as too radical a leader for their taste. They resented what they believed to be Nkrumah's blatant effort to bring the Mozambican nationalists under his sphere of influence. Fearing that he could in fact pose a threat to Nyerere's desire

to become the champion of southern Africa's nationalist cause, the Tanzanians took action.

The Nyerere government opted for MANU, essentially an organization of Makonde people with roots in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, bordering Tanzania. Some of its members had been born and reared in Tanzania, others in Zanzibar and Kenya. In the early 1960s, there were an estimated 250000 Mozambicans, notably Makonde, living in Tanzania. They worked primarily in plantations, but were also involved in trade union and political activities. Rashidi Kawawa, who became secretary general of the ruling Tanzanian party, TANU, was a Makonde from Mozambique. Oscar Kambona, the Tanzania home affairs and foreign minister, was another Mozambican. A Mozambican Makonde was the president of the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association. Mozambican Makonde in the three countries were affiliated with the Makonde African Association (MAA). In Cabo Delgado itself, the Makonde campaigned politically as the Sociedade dos Africanos de Mozambique, and were behind the events that preceded the Mueda massacre of June 1960.

In January 1961, the MAA branches in Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Zanzibar, led respectively by Matthew Mmole, Samuly Diankali and Ali Madebe, merged as MANU. The presidency and vice-presidency of the new party were given to Mmole and Lawrence Malinga Millinga, both born in Tanzania. The similarities between MANU and TANU were not only in the name. Some in MANU aimed at the unification of Cabo Delgado with Tanzania for a greater Makonde homeland.

Udenamo felt that the prospect of an armed struggle looked unlikely. The Tanzanian government discontinued food supplies and other assistance that it had been giving Udenamo. Tanzania declared Adelino Gwambe *persona non grata* for stating in a news conference on the eve of that country's independence that arrangements had been made for Udenamo to start the armed struggle in Mozambique. He had to leave for Accra, but was allowed to return to Tanzania soon afterwards. When Ghana invited Udenamo to attend the May-June 1962 African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra, the Tanzanians refused to issue travel documents to the Udenamo delegation. These had to be organized by the Ghanaian High Commission in Dar es Salaam.

It was not only the Tanzanian government that had grown distrustful of Nkrumah. Marcelino dos Santos was not at all impressed with Nkru-mah for regarding him as not truly representative of the black people of Mozambique since he was a mulatto. To prevent a worsening of relations

with Tanzania, and bearing in mind the strategic importance of that country for the attainment of Mozambique's independence, Marcelino dos Santos advised his fellow leaders to merge with MANU. Gwambe rejected the idea outright; Marcelino dos Santos reacted by threatening to leave Udenamo and join MANU. But at several meetings of Udenamo's Executive Committee held throughout October 1961, it was decided that, in order to overcome the prevailing situation, Udenamo and MANU should unite. In order to gain MANU's sympathy, Udenamo officials made use of their financial resources to virtually bribe members of the Makonde organization to join them. In another move, Udenamo included MANU leaders in its delegation to the African Freedom Fighters Conference in Accra.

At a ceremony held under the auspices of the Tanzanian government in Dar es Salaam on 24 May 1962, Udenamo and MANU finally 'decided to bring unity of all patriotic forces of Mozambique by means of forming a common front', pending the return of the respective leaders from Accra.¹¹ Much to the irritation of the Tanzanians, Gwambe told a news conference in Accra five days later that the decision to merge was in response to Nkrumah's call for the closing of ranks for the liberation of Africa.¹² As proposed by Mahluza, the front was to be known as the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique.

With unity talks between Udenamo and MANU under way, Jose Balazara da Costa Chagonga, the leader of Unami, arrived in Dar es Salaam, in 1959, Chagonga had founded the Associacao Nacional Africana de Moatize, ostensibly a cultural association of Moatize coal mineworkers as well as Mozambican migrants in Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia. In reality, the association promoted nationalist ideals among its members. An advocate of peaceful change, Chagonga had been petitioning the Portuguese to review unsavoury labor practices in the colony. This resulted in his detention. Upon his release, Chagonga fled to Malawi where in May 1960 he renamed his organization Unami. The joyful mood of the Mozambican nationalists while in Ghana contrasted sharply with the showdown in store for them in Dar es Salaam in the days preceding the official debut of Frelimo.

Mondlane, who had resigned from his UN post to become a professor at New York's University of Syracuse, arrived in Dar es Salaam in the first half of June. Discussing his planned trip to Tanzania with State Department officials in Washington on 8 February 1962, Mondlane reiterated his intention to lead the Mozambique independence movement, and that he would be willing to negotiate with Portugal, but could only accept 'the negotiations of equals'. Mondlane said he had approached Angola's

UPA guerrilla leader, Holden Roberto, to enlist the support of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba for the movement he intended to lead. As Mondlane told the State Department officials, Bourguiba was deeply concerned with communist penetration in sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly worried by Soviet arms shipment to the area. Mondlane did not seem to regard Udenamo and MANU as a major obstacle to his plans. He saw Gwambe as a second-rate figure, and MANU a group artificially stimulated by the Tanzanians with no organization within Mozambique. Mondlane noted that any successful MANU-oriented insurrection in Mozambique would be an 'outside job', and might result in the cession of Cabo Delgado and Niassa to Tanzania.¹³

In Dar es Salaam, Mondlane encountered strong resistance to his plan among the Udenamo and MANU leaders. Gwambe was committed to taking upon himself the leadership of Frelimo and soon starting the war of independence with the backing of Ghana where Mozambicans had reportedly undergone military training. For Mondlane, time was running out. He had to be back at Syracuse before the end of June.

On 18 June, a despondent Mondlane called on Thomas Byrne, the acting American charge d'affaires in Dar es Salaam, to report his dismay at Gwambe's complete commitment to Nkrumah and to communist bloc countries. Mondlane alleged that the Udenamo leader was a regular recipient of substantial funds from Ghana and the USSR, and that he had recently received \$14000 from the Ghanaians. Mondlane was also disturbed to learn that Mmole and his lieutenants were in Gwambe's pay. Mondlane realized that there was a degree of discontent among Udenamo's rank and file over the tight control that Gwambe had over the organization's financial resources. Mondlane informed the charge d'affaires that he had raised this issue with Kambona, pointing out to him that a continuation of the existing arrangement, whereby Gwambe had ample resources while both the Udenamo and MANU treasuries were empty, meant that the Mozambique nationalist movement belonged to Gwambe and he in turn could deliver it to his Ghanaian and Russian paymasters. Mondlane urged Kambona to consider the advantage of securing funds from Western sources in order to free the Mozambique movement from Gwambe.¹⁴

Mondlane's recommendations were music to the Tanzanians' ears in view of their reluctance to have an organization based in their country, but under Ghanaian influence. Moreover, by this time the Tanzanians realized that of all the Mozambicans who had flocked to Dar es Salaam, Mondlane was the one who possessed the best qualities to head an independence movement: mature, well-educated, articulate, able to

move in diplomatic circles, and committed to a negotiated settlement with Portugal, an option they initially preferred for Tanzania felt impotent to deal with possible Portuguese military retaliation.

To counter Gwambe's financial clout, on his way to Syracuse Mondlane planned to stop over in Cairo, Tunis, Geneva and London and raise funds. 'As soon as he reaches the United States', reported Byrne, 'Mr Mondlane plans to get in touch with Deputy Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs] Wayne Fredericks.'¹⁵ Mondlane planned to be back in Dar es Salaam in September when he would make his final bid for the Frelimo leadership.

Subsequent developments enabled Mondlane to secure his position as Frelimo leader on 25 June. With Gwambe away in India between 17 and 23 June, Mondlane was able to rally the support of Mozambicans in Dar es Salaam, virtually unopposed. He reviewed his earlier position, and decided to meet Mozambicans in Dar es Salaam as a Udenamo member. Mondlane, who had always shown concern over the educational elevation of his fellow countrymen, lured Udenamo and MANU members to his side with genuine promises of scholarships in the United States. Until then, Gwambe had discouraged Mozambican refugees from contacting the American Embassy in Dar es Salaam for scholarship requests, claiming that Portuguese agents would kidnap them while en route to the United States. Still according to Byrne, Mondlane had informed him that he had persuaded the Ghanaians, through the Ghana High Commissioner in Dar es Salaam, of Gwambe's unsuitability as Frelimo leader. Mondlane also stated that Gwambe's lieutenants and MANU officials had promised to oppose Gwambe on condition that Mondlane found alternative sources of income to finance their activities.¹⁶

On 28 June, Mondlane made yet another call on charge d'affaires Byrne, asking him to inform Fredericks of his desperate need for funds in order to consolidate Frelimo's independence from Ghanaian and Communist bloc countries. Mondlane added that he had spent over \$1000 of his personal funds towards that goal.¹⁷

Mondlane's behind the scenes canvassing was a success. His name was included in the list of candidates to the presidency of Frelimo's Supreme Council due to be elected on 25 June. After Gwambe and Mmole had signed a declaration agreeing to transfer all assets owned and controlled by their organizations to the Supreme Council of Frelimo immediately after the election of this body, a 20-man ad hoc committee composed of an equal number of Udenamo and MANU members nominated Mondlane, Simanga and Chagonga as candidates to the post. Gwambe

refused to stand for election as long as Mondlane was part of the organization.

Mondlane received 116 votes from a total of 135 ballots cast. Ethnic considerations, more than his academic and professional qualifications, prevailed in Mondlane's election. With Gwambe out of the race, Udenamo members from southern Mozambique preferred to have a southerner as Frelimo leader rather than Reverend Uria Simango, a Ndau from the central region, despite the latter's long-standing membership of Udenamo. Simango secured the vice-presidency of Frelimo, and other Udenamo members gained key positions in the organization. David Mabunda and Paulo Gumane received the posts of secretary general and deputy secretary general respectively. The foreign affairs secretariat was assigned to Marcelino dos Santos, and the defense and security secretariat to Joao Munguambe with Filipe Magaia as his deputy. The administration department was given to Silverio Nungo. Gumane's wife, Priscilla, was appointed Women's League secretary. Leo Milas became Frelimo's information and publicity secretary. Milas, who lived in the United States and had established links with Udenamo shortly after the organization surfaced in Dar es Salaam, accompanied Mondlane to Tanzania. Mmole was elected treasurer, and Millinga became Frelimo's executive secretary of the Scholarship Committee.

After the elections, Mondlane, in a move apparently to have Gwambe removed from the scene, told Kambona that he and his wife, Janet, were under surveillance of armed men owing allegiance to Gwambe, claiming that the latter had informed the Portuguese of Mondlane's travelling plans so that he could be abducted while in transit in Rome. The Tanzanians ordered the arrest of Gwambe on 27 June, but fell short of declaring him *persona non grata* again upon his release. Kambona assured Mondlane that Gwambe would not be allowed to re-enter the country once he left on 3 July to attend a World Peace Council meeting in Moscow.

As for his relations with Ghana, Mondlane felt that they were bound to improve since he was now the elected Frelimo leader. He told Byrne that the Ghanaian High Commission in Tanzania had even invited him to visit Accra, giving him air tickets.¹⁸

Byrne commented in a cable to the Department of State:

Dr Mondlane's position as leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front appears at the moment to be strong. His future prospects will depend to a great extent upon how successful he is in obtaining money to carry on the party's activities here. Another as yet unclear

factor is the sincerity of Kambona's assurance of support. If Ghana is now shifting its support from Gwambe to Mondlane, the latter's position should be secure.¹⁹

2

Profile of a Leader

Eduardo Mondlane was born in 1920 of a family who were traditional rulers of the Chope people. He was educated by Calvinist Swiss missionaries who arranged for Mondlane to further his studies in South Africa, Portugal and the United States. Mondlane could not graduate from the Witwatersrand University because the South Africans refused to renew his visa. In 1950, he enrolled at the Lisbon University because the missionaries felt it would be advantageous for Mondlane to acquire the basis of Portuguese culture, which would help in his work once he returned to Mozambique.²⁰ But he did not stay in Lisbon long, pursuing instead his education in the United States where he obtained a doctorate in anthropology in 1960.

The Portuguese viewed Mondlane's departure for the United States in 1951 as the result of the US policy of wooing undergraduates from their colonies, rather than of Mondlane's anti-colonial stance. In fact, Mondlane took a moderate view of the low educational and health standards Portugal maintained in Mozambique. 'The most important reason' for this state of affairs, wrote Mondlane, was 'a material one: Not enough money', and that 'the Portuguese government (had) done everything in its power to eliminate disease in Mozambique'.²¹

In 1957, Mondlane joined the UN Trusteeship Council. He established cordial links with the Portuguese delegation at the United Nations, Portugal being only too keen to court him. Adriano Moreira, minister of the Portuguese colonies, whom Mondlane regarded as willing to introduce far-reaching changes to Portugal's African policy, recalls having arranged for a gold necklace to be delivered to the Mondlane couple as a birthday present for their son.²²

Mondlane and his American wife now visited Mozambique after an 11-year absence. The Portuguese made a concerted effort to impress the

couple. Mondlane, who arrived in Lourenco Marques in February 1961, attended a number of lavish functions held in his honor, socializing with senior government officials. At a sundowner in Chongoene beach, Mondlane sat next to the local chairman of Salazar's Fascist-styled Uniao Nacional party. The state media covered the visit in a manner true to form, referring to Mondlane as 'the Portuguese professor', quoting him as saying that he was leaving Mozambique 'more Portuguese than he used to be'.²¹

Mondlane hinted to the Portuguese that he would like to be a university lecturer either in Mozambique or in Portugal. In Lisbon, en route to New York, Moreira offered him a position at the Institute of Tropical Medicine. Mondlane told Moreira that he would rather get the post by standard admission procedure. According to Moreira, 'Mondlane did not follow it up because he felt that I would not be able to stay in office longer'.²⁴

Portugal's flirtation with Mondlane did not last long. With Mondlane already in the United States, his wife met Moreira in Lisbon to let him know that her husband would not be returning to either Mozambique or Portugal, considering the reforms of the Portuguese too limited. Nevertheless, in the years to come, Mondlane continued to hold Moreira in high esteem.²⁵

Although he outmanoeuvred Gwambe in his bid for the Frelimo leadership, Mondlane never succeeded in fully consolidating his position in view of Frelimo's complex ideological and ethnic undercurrents, and different perceptions of how and when independence should be achieved. Mondlane favoured a negotiated settlement with Portugal, and believed that the West would exert pressure on Lisbon to resolve the colonial dispute peacefully. Other Frelimo officials supported immediate military action. Even when Mondlane opted for armed struggle, he preferred Frelimo not to undertake large-scale operations against the Portuguese until Frelimo and Tanzania would be able to contain Portuguese counter-attacks. Mondlane's distaste of violence attracted criticism, giving rise to claims that he was not committed to independence. His association with the United States, traditionally an ally of Portugal, strengthened this view. Certain quarters, which in principle would have backed any nationalist leader, instead openly opposed him. In addition to Ghana, Algeria and Cuba expressed dissatisfaction with Mondlane.

Mondlane's plan of leading Frelimo on a part-time basis soon foundered. Owing to his job, Mondlane wanted Frelimo's first congress, scheduled for September 1962, to be held in December. Given the pace of developments in Dar es Salaam, Mondlane compromised on 23-25

September. He applied for leave from Syracuse between January 1963 and February 1964. As an alternative source of income, Mondlane had suggested, before leaving for the Frelimo Congress, a Tanzanian job offer to Nyerere. He told Nyerere that:

The alternative to this [...] is for me to resign from my current position, pack up and ask the world to send me and my family to Tanganyika. If by any chance some interested soul or government, which are very difficult to find, donated the required amount for the air fare to Dar, where would I lodge my family, and what would I feed them with, etc.²⁶

In August 1962, Gumane publicly embarrassed Mondlane, by expressing Frelimo's 'disgust (at) the action taken by the United States of America and other colonialist and imperialist countries at the United Nations on the case of Mozambique'. Afterwards, Gumane explained to the US Embassy that his statement was an attempt to deflect Gwambe's claims that Mondlane was an American stooge.²⁷

In Cairo in the same month, Mmole and Gwambe issued a statement suggesting dual presidency of Udenamo and MANU leaders for Frelimo.²⁸ Gwambe denounced Mondlane as a traitor and as 'Mozambique's Tshombe'. In a letter to Frelimo members, Gwambe said he would never be part of Frelimo under Mondlane because he had 'proof that Mondlane (was) selling out Mozambique to the imperialists led by the United States of America'.²⁹

Early in September, Millinga wrote an open letter to the American assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Mennen Williams, protesting the inconsistency between the US public stance on Africa and the American vote at the United Nations 'against resolutions calling to free Mozambique Africans from barbaric Portuguese rule'. Once again, Gumane apologized to the American Embassy, promising the censure of Millinga.³⁰

Furthermore, Frelimo was facing difficulty in supporting its members financially. Frelimo could not support party officials in Tanzania, let alone delegates arriving for the September Congress. Eventually, money was obtained from the Ghanaian Embassy in Cairo, although the Ghanaians were under the impression that they were financing Gwambe's crusade against Mondlane.³¹

At the Congress, Marcelino dos Santos delivered the most militant speech. The constitution he had drafted for Udenamo was adopted by Frelimo, retaining its Marxist outlook.

6

Zambia Backs Frelimo Dissidents

There were efforts to reconcile the Frelimo dissidents. In June 1964, while in Dar es Salaam for an African Liberation Committee meeting, Paulo Gumane held talks with Mondlane. No agreement was reached between Frelimo and Udenamo-Mocambique.

In November, Baltazar Chagonga urged Mondlane to meet the leaders of the other parties in Lusaka with a view to 'uniting all Mozambicans, free of tribal or class segregation'. Chagonga stressed that his party, LJnami, 'reiterate[d] its policy as an affiliated Frelimo member, and shall be represented as such within and outside Frelimo'.⁸¹ Responding to Chagonga in typical Portuguese style, Mondlane's missive was harsh and disconcerting:

There is no Unami party for Your Excellency is aware that such party has never existed. When Frelimo was established on 25 June 1962, Your Excellency lived here in Dar es Salaam with no movement to lead. When it became necessary to ask for your participation in the founding conference, you had to join one of the parties to acquire the right to attend it. Your Excellency submitted your candidacy to the presidency, not as president of Unami, but as a Frelimo member.⁸²

Subsequent meetings between Gumane and the Frelimo leadership were held in Dar es Salaam in November, and in January 1965. Gumane proposed that his party could join Frelimo provided that eight of the Central Committee's 15 seats, the vice presidency, and the defense and foreign affairs portfolios were assigned to Udenamo-Mocambique. Mondlane agreed on the vice-presidency and foreign affairs posts. He offered Gumane low-key portfolios like publicity and information, education, and health and social welfare, noting Udenamo would have

non-executive powers. Talks between the two organizations were called off with no palpable results achieved.⁸³

An attempt to unite all the Mozambican factions in a single front was made in 1965, this time by the Zambian government. The Udenamo factions of Gumane and Gwambe, as well as the MANC and Frelimo, gathered in Lusaka from 24 to 31 March. MANU and Unami were not represented at the meeting, though its leaders agreed in principle with the idea of a united front. Chagonga did not believe a merger would imply the disbanding of his party.⁸⁴

Mondlane rejected the idea of a new organization being formed. Unable to rally the support of the Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, in convincing the other organizations to join Frelimo, Mondlane left Lusaka. He would base his decision on the 'unbelievable insolence on the part of other participants and minor Zambian Government officials', the latter a reference to Rankin Sikasula and A Kangwa who chaired the various proceedings.⁸⁵

In a statement issued at the end of unity talks, Kangwa, the Zambian ruling party's under-secretary for Pan-African affairs, pointed out that

All means by other parties, including myself, to persuade or appeal to FRELIMO to look into the need for UNITY at present; to think twice over their conditions for unity; and to try to bring in suggestions or concessions so as to meet the other parties in one way or the other, failed entirely [...] only three parties were willing to unite [...] FRELIMO members were asked to leave the Conference since they had refused UNITY with other organizations on the conditions agreed by the three organizations.⁸⁶

The other parties agreed to merge under the *Comite Revolucionario de Mozambique, Coremo*. Like Unami, MANU never joined Coremo. Unami remained active in Malawi, receiving token financial assistance from the Banda government. Its goal remained a negotiated settlement with the Portuguese. The colonial authorities would use Unami as a buffer against Frelimo, and let Chagonga return to Mozambique.⁸⁷ He died virtually ignored in Mozambique after independence in September 1988.

Gwambe became Coremo president, Gumane the vice-president, Joseph Chiteje the secretary general, and Fanuel Mahluza the defense chief. The organization drew its membership from a cross-section of Mozambique's ethnic groups.

Immediately, Coremo faced an acute lack of resources to campaign militarily for independence. Although recognized by the OAU, Coremo was never granted assistance by its African Liberation Committee, which was based in and led from Tanzania. Military training was given in China to where Mahluza went in 1965. Former Frelimo members with military experience formed the nucleus of Coremo's *Exercito Revo-lucionario Popular de Mozambique*, Erepomo. The Zambian government diverted to Coremo military hardware earmarked by the African Liberation Committee for other southern African guerrilla movements based in Zambia. Another source of Coremo's war materiel was South Africa's Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). In return, Coremo undertook to escort PAC guerrillas wanting to infiltrate South Africa through Mozambique.

Other African countries, particularly Ghana, provided political and diplomatic support for Coremo. Mondlane's apprehensions about this development became evident during an OAU conference held in Accra in October 1965 for which Coremo was invited. Frelimo, Mondlane said, 'has been very badly treated at the conference', adding:

To start with, the government of Ghana invited Gwambe's delegation. Although they put us in a decent hotel, Gwambe and his delegation stayed at the African Association Centre. Similarly, Diallo Telli's speech was generally against Frelimo and pro-Coremo, alleging that Frelimo refused to join other nationalist movements and to recommend the armed struggle.⁸⁸

Nonetheless, as a CIA report noted, Coremo and other rival organizations, lacked 'the capacity to threaten [the Frelimo] leadership either in terms of external support or political following', and for this reason 'Mondlane seems likely to hang on to his job for some time, largely because he has established credentials as a nationalist in African and other circles abroad'.⁸⁹

Coremo began its war in Tete province's northwestern region at the end of 1965. Subsequently, Coremo guerrillas used the province's northeastern region as an infiltration route. The guerrillas unsuccessfully tried in 1966 to operate in Zambezia's Milange and Morrumbala areas, using southern Malawi as a corridor.⁹⁰ What distinguished the organization from Frelimo was that its senior officials took part in military operations, rather than leaving it as a task for the military cadres only. And unlike Frelimo, as an author observed, Coremo's claims of battle victory were refreshingly modest.⁹¹