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SPECIAL BROWSE "MOLE"
CONSOLIDATED REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The conclusion reached as a result of the present browse, is that there are strong indications that former Deputy President Jacob Zuma's presidential ambitions are fuelled and sustained by a conspiracy playing out both inside South Africa and on the African continental stage.

Inside South Africa, as is well known, groupings, like the South African Communist Party, the ANC Youth League, the SACP's Youth League and Cosatu, seemingly disaffected from the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, have largely thrown in their lot with the former Deputy President; along with these there exist elements within the Security and Intelligence Services that appear to be considering the subversion of the apparatus of State in support of a Zuma presidency.

On the continental level, inquiries have revealed that several Heads of State and leaders of African politico/military groupings, apparently alienated by South Africa's perceived pre-eminence in the African Union and especially in Nepal, appear to be providing both funding and support to Zuma's cause. In some case these political leaders appear to pose a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the South African State.

The purpose of this browse was not to gather direct evidence but rather to access information informally and discreetly, and on the basis of these inquiries, arrive at a preliminary analysis of threat, and to make recommendations for further action.

It can be stated in this regard, that, while Zuma's support base is relatively loose and multi-layered, there are indications that elements are manipulating the Zuma cause, and that these could indeed be considered to pose a serious

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threat to the integrity of the South African State. Further and targeted investigations are recommended to verify, and test the implications of, the allegations and intelligence recorded herein.

ANGOLAN INTELLIGENCE INVOLVEMENT

A well-sourced private-sector intelligence report in the possession of the DSO alleges that some time in 2005, the President of Angola, Eduardo Dos Santos directly tasked the then Chief of Angola's External Intelligence Service, General Fernando Miala with identifying and reporting on ways in which Angola could provide support to Jacob Zuma, and further his presidential aspirations. Miala was at the same time tasked with providing an analysis of the presidential succession environment, with a view to guiding Angolan government interventions to influence matters in Zuma's favour.

In the event, according to the intelligence report referred to above, Miala failed to execute the taskings to Dos Santos' satisfaction. This failure is cited as one of the major reasons for the removal from office and the arrest of Miala in February 2006.

It appears that Miala was accused of using the brief in the interest of Tokyo Sexwale and not that of Zuma, and, moreover, of conniving against Dos Santos. (See below).

Subsequent to the arrest of Miala, the "South Africa Dossier" has been handed over to Miala's arch enemy, General Manuel Vieira Dias Junior (Kopelipa), head of Counterintelligence and Special Advisor to Dos Santos on Military Affairs.

BACKGROUND: Angolan Intelligence

It is important to note that the South African intelligence environment appears to be dangerously infiltrated and compromised by Angolan agents, reflecting a heritage of ANC intelligence cadres operating out of Angolan bases, and in

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partnership, with the ruling Angolan MPLA in apartheid era wars in the frontline states and the struggle against apartheid in general.

Just how close these connections continue to be, is illustrated by the following (corroborated) information gleaned in the course of the present browse: that at the time of the attempted *coup* in Equatorial Guinea, the full text of a South African Intelligence report was made available to the authorities of that country by Angolan Intelligence, whereas only an edited version of the same report was supplied to the Guineans by the South African government.

The closeness of these secret bonds would apparently position the Angolans well to access South African secret information and for Angolan operatives to be in a position to fulfil the Dos Santos tasking.

However the situation is complicated by tensions existing within the Angolan intelligence and security community, notably between Miala himself and General Manuel Vieira Dias Junior (known as Kopelipa), head of Counterintelligence and Special Advisor on Military Affairs to Dos Santos. Kopelipa is identified as part of the *securocrat* old guard within the Angolan establishment, as opposed to Miala, who is known as a reformer and moderniser. It is the faction associated with Kopelipa (like the ANC's intelligence elite, largely Soviet trained) that would have been more closely connected with ANC intelligence cadres in the apartheid era.

BACKGROUND: Fernando Garcia Miala / Kopelipa

Miala is the former head of External Intelligence in Angola. He represents a relatively enlightened and modernised faction in the Angolan military and stands at odds with the Soviet-trained old guard, foremost among which is Kopelipa, Angola's Chief of Counterintelligence. The struggle between these two for power and ascendancy is material to Angola's covert involvement in the succession scenario in South Africa, but is also underpinned by the play of global power.

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The relevant background here is as follows:

- In the later stages of the Angolan civil war, the ruling MPLA accessed weapons on the black market via a French dealer by the name of Falcone, who was in partnership with one Arkady Gaydamak, a former Soviet entrepreneur with access to Soviet arsenals. Payment for the weapons – transferred in defiance of embargos – was extortionate and, between them, Falcone and Gaydamak defrauded the Angolans of very significant sums of money. Sums involved ran into billions of dollars, and Miala was one of several Angolan officials allegedly implicated in the fraud.
- In due course (around 2002) the French investigated the weapons deals and the issue grew into an international scandal – to the embarrassment of President Dos Santos of Angola, who sought to intervene with French President Jacques Chirac, to keep a lid on his own actions in buying the weapons on the black market.
- However Dos Santos was given short shrift and personally snubbed by Chirac, and as a result ended nursing a grudge against the French to the extent that he evicted the French oil company Total from oil concessions they had been awarded off the Angolan coast.
- There followed a protracted freeze in relations. These began however, gradually, to thaw as a result of the interventions of Miala, working behind the scenes to re-establish ties with the French, and more particularly promoting the interests of South African entrepreneur Tokyo Sexwale, who apparently had built a close association with the French in the Angolan context.

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Against this background the following reportedly transpired:

- In late February, 2006, in his capacity as the ranking intelligence officer in Angola, and ahead of the Angolan carnival holiday at the end of the month, Miala apparently proposed to Dos Santos that he should use the carnival to engage in some image polishing – specifically to engage with the revellers on the streets and present himself as a man of the people. Miala apparently assured Dos Santos that his intelligence suggested this was eminently possible and that there would be no threats against the person of the president.
- At this point, Kopelipa, Chief of Counterintelligence approached Dos Santos warning him of an alleged assassination plot. He told Dos Santos he had evidence that hitmen would be in the crowd, posing as revellers, but actually bent on assassination.
- In a report later submitted to Dos Santos, Kopelipa apparently went further, specifying that Miala was working in cahoots with the French in the alleged assassination plot, and that Tokyo Sexwale was also involved, and had apparently made at least some of the hitmen available for the job.
- Whether all or some of this has substance, or whether it was a merely manufactured intrigue aimed at neutralising Kopelipa's enemies, is unclear.
- The upshot, however, was a purge by Dos Santos of the External Intelligence hierarchy, and the arrest of Miala on, amongst others, treason charges.
- In the present context, it has apparently guaranteed the pre-eminence of Kopelipa in the context of Angolan intelligence, and – as emerges

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from the intelligence report cited above - his covert involvement at the behest of Dos Santos, in furthering the cause of Jacob Zuma.

JACOB ZUMA'S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

The following could prove important in relation to Zuma's involvement in Angola and surrounding areas:

- Kopelipa is a business partner of Isabel Dos Santos, daughter of President Dos Santos, who in turn is known to have been a business partner and associate of Brett Kebble. Kebble, shortly before his death, as Zuma's then major funder, was in the process of introducing Zuma into the business partnership environment in Angola.
- Around the time of the assassination of Brett Kebble, Kebble was busy setting up business deals between Zuma and unnamed Angolan generals via the good offices of the former Angolan Ambassador to South Africa, Tião Rodriguez. A ticket had been booked for Zuma to travel with Kebble and/or members of his camp to Angola, to pursue diamond deals there. This was at the time that Zuma lost his official positions and apparently aimed at setting him in funds. At the time, Kebble was engaged in setting up deals around several diamond concessions with Angolan partners, and, is widely believed in the diamond industry to have laundered illicit diamonds through the Letseng diamond mine in Lesotho.
- In the first part of 2005 a TAG aircraft was grounded and impounded inside South African borders. The grounding was in accordance with a legal order against some moneys owing by Angolan interests to some private contractor. The grounding of the aircraft led to a highlevel government delegation from Angola coming to South Africa to resolve the crisis. Approached for assistance by the Angolans Jacob Zuma managed to override the court order and secure the release of the

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aircraft. The overriding of the court order was effected via Judge Shongwe, who later recused himself from presiding over the Zuma rape trial on the basis of family connections. In exchange for the favour Zuma was given an oil concession in the north of Angola. Zuma established accompany by the name of Amaghawe Wase Petroleum to exploit the concession.

NOTE: The above information is verified. Further detail is available from a private investigator who was involved in the affair. However, to protect the integrity of the browse, the investigator has not been approached directly, as he is considered a potential security risk. Investigators, however would be able to follow up in this regard.

- Unconfirmed information has come to light from other sources to the effect that Jacob Zuma met with officials of both Angola and Libya and that "financial assistance" was either promised or given. Though the full facts are not known, this could be fertile ground for money laundering.
- It has been confirmed that Zuma travelled to Mozambique (in August 2005), Angola (in October and November 2005, as well as between the 20th and 27th of June 2006) and Libya (in December 2005). These trips should be scrutinized as being possibly connected securing funding and garnering covert support for his presidential aspirations, and also in connection with possible money laundering.
- A source with a strong intelligence background and currently working as a security consultant in Angola links Zuma to oil concessions granted in the central coastal areas of Angola, as well as to deals in rough diamonds. These deals allegedly came about in fulfillment of instructions given by the Angolan government to two prominent individuals, to assist Zuma in accessing funds for his political activities in South Africa.

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These are namely:

- o Daniel Quipaxe, Managing Director of the ongoing Benguela Railway project;
 - o Dumilda Rangel, governor of the Benguela province.
- Quipaxe and Rangel may also have engaged Zuma in other deals and partnerships, though details are not known at this stage. In this regard, as well as in connection with all the deals alluded to above, further and targeted investigation, particularly of a financial order, in order to follow the money trails, could produce evidence of criminal wrongdoing. It is important to note here, however, that it is not yet certain that Zuma was in a position to maximise possible business opportunities, or was able to exploit commercial possibilities that might have presented themselves.
 - A second private intelligence report (Report 2) of which the DSO has had sight states that in April 2006, Jacob Zuma travelled to Angola, where he met with Kopelipa to conclude a deal for the supply of cement to Angola. The mechanism whereby this was to be effected is unknown, but the corporate vehicle to be used is specified as Amaghawe Investments. It is alleged in the report that the South African ambassador to Angola, Siphili Sibeko served as an intermediary.
 - The same report also makes note of a deal being struck with DRC rebel leader Etienne Tshisikedi around a concession in Ituri. The funding partner here is specified as an unnamed American investor. According to the report Zuma met with Silvia Dzobo, the daughter of Tshisikedi on April 6, 2006, to cement the deal.
 - The report also makes mention of ongoing negotiations between the Zuma-linked company Amaghawe Investments and the Zimbabwean

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Ambassador in South Africa, Simon Moyo, around partnerships in exploiting oil reserves. Further detail is not available in this regard.

- According to a well-placed source, a possible channel for covert funding exists via an entity identified as "Batlodi Housing", operating out of Bedford Centre Office Centre. This entity, according to the informant, while fronting as a low-cost housing initiative, purportedly launders money for syndicates allegedly connected with Zuma, in partnership with Angolan generals. (No company registration was found under the exact name, Batlodi Housing; verification and identification exercises will have to be undertaken in this regard.)

LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT

According to the second intelligence report cited herein (Report 2), Jacob Zuma visited Libya on three occasions between August and December 2005, though only one of these visits (in December 2005) is, at this stage, independently verified by the DSO.

In the course of these visits, according to the report, Zuma met with Musa Kusa, Muammar Khadafi's Chief of External Intelligence, and in one meeting a sum of \$5 million was handed over. The purpose of this donation was allegedly to promote the mobilisation of mass support at street level against the status quo in South Africa and in support of Zuma's presidential campaign.

The money was understood to be the first instalment of an ongoing commitment, though it is unclear whether further moneys have yet been forthcoming.

Information gleaned from an impeccable source dovetails with the allegations in Report 2. (The fact of Zuma's trip to Libya and the connection with the SACP delegation has been reported in the media.) The source here indicates

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that discussions between Zuma and the Libyan authorities were facilitated by SACP Secretary General Blade Nzimande, on the occasion of an SACP delegation visiting Libya in late 2005. The source indicates that Nzimande arranged for Zuma to travel to Libya for the purpose of the meetings, and that a sum of money between \$3 and \$5 million was given to Zuma by the Libyans on this occasion. The source also indicates that discussions involving both Zuma and Nzimande centred on the promotion of a street-level revolution in South Africa, in support of Zuma's political aspirations.

There are no strong indications at present as to how such money would have been transferred, whether it was made available in cash or laundered via business entities. However the following, though entirely speculative, could be of relevance:

- One of the major South African business ventures in Libya is a water management project by the engineering company BKS, whose chairperson is Advocate Kessie Naidoo, who in the past has represented Zuma, though it should also be remembered, acted as Evidence Leader in the Hefer Commission.
 - o BKS is 30% owned by Harambee Investment Holding, whose directors include Nora Fakude-Nkuna, a known benefactor, associate and beneficiary of Jacob Zuma, Fakude-Nkuna also serves on the board of directors of BKS.
 - o Another director of BKS is Mathuding Ramathodi, wife of Ngoako Ramathodi.
 - o BKS, via its international arm, BKS Global Limited, was listed as having two other major construction projects in the pipeline in late 2005. If monies were laundered via the BKS group, this could provide a viable mechanism.
 - o It is worth noting that BKS is more or less unique among South African companies, in having major business interests in Libya. Government sources indicate that for the most part, business initiatives essayed under a joint bilateral body, set

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up on a South African State visit to Libya in 2002, were stillborn, as a result of anti-Nepad sentiment on the part of Khadafi. However, in the Interim Zuma visited Libya on several occasions, and it appears that the BKS initiative was confirmed as a result of these, rather than as part of the official bilateral process.

- o Zuma is recorded as having been prominent (in his role as head of government business) in establishing bilateral business relationships between Libya and South Africa, and led several business delegations to Tripoli in the first half of this decade.
- A very well-placed source has identified the account of the Kopano Solidarity Fund, operating out of First National Bank in Melville, as a possible conduit for funds to Zuma. The SACP's Nzimande is a signatory on this account.
- The same source also indicated that the accounts of lawyers acting for Zuma were also understood to be receiving moneys, either directly or indirectly, from foreign benefactors.
- Khadafi is also alleged to be involved in initiatives at the continental level, to influence the course of South African politics in favour of Jacob Zuma, as emerges below.

AFRICAN CONTINENTAL INITIATIVES

In April 2006, at an unknown venue, but as part of ongoing continental negotiations around conflict in the Great lakes region, a grouping of senior African politicians allegedly came together, to discuss ways of promoting the cause of Jacob Zuma and the toppling of the Thabo Mbeki regime in South Africa. The source of this information is connected with bodyguarding and has

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networks of informants operating in this sector. The information, however, remains unconfirmed at this time.

Among those allegedly present at the meeting in question were the following, or their representatives:

- General Abdusalam Abubakar, the northern leader in Nigeria
- Muammar Khadafi
- The President of Cote d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo.
- Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of Congo Brazzaville
- Unnamed rebel leaders from the DRC
- Unnamed Angolan representatives.

Possible military support for the Zuma cause was allegedly discussed in the context of a rolling ground-level revolution in pursuit of Zuma's presidential aspirations.

SHAFT 17 MEETING

Information has also come to light regarding a meeting inside South Africa which apparently mirrors the meeting referred to above. The source of this information is a protocol official in the public sector, who in turn received the information from two independent sources. Partial corroboration has been secured subsequently from the bodyguarding informant mentioned above.

Earlier in 2006, probably in mid-April the former Chief of the SANDF, Siphwe Nyanda, allegedly was present at a meeting held at the Shaft 17 Conference Centre at Nasrec outside Johannesburg, with a select group of senior former MK leaders, now part of the general staff of the SANDF. There were also allegedly ambassadors from African countries on the guest list and present at the meeting. The African diplomats are identified as being from countries in the Great Lakes region who, in recent months, have called on South Africa to reinstate Zuma as a conflict mediator in the Central African region. These would then probably include representatives from Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and

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Congo Brazzaville, possibly among others. The meeting is probably connected with earlier Pro-Zuma initiatives in the Great Lakes region.

It is unclear who called the meeting, or under whose auspices it was held. However the purpose appears to have been to frame strategies at a largely military level in support of the Zuma cause.

According to both DSO sources, Nyanda was upbraided in the course of the meeting, with others MK veterans present questioning his credentials. The brunt of the criticism was that Nyanda had been an "Mbeki man" before being released from his top job, and as a result was given only "observer status" in proceedings. By way of background here, it is known that Nyanda's disgruntlement with the present regime stems in part from the fact that, after his early retirement in May 2005, he was reportedly given only a fraction of what he considered his full pension payout.

Though detail around the meeting remains sketchy, the sources concur that a possible alignment of the military in support of Zuma was raised by Nyanda, as well as the possibility of a military coup, or use of the military to force Mbeki to stand down. Such discussions were in the context of foreign military assistance.

According to the protocol source, mention was made in the course of the meeting of military or paramilitary formations being trained in northern Mozambique, to operate as part of a destabilisation strategy inside South African borders. Apparently ambassadors present at the meeting were to pledge military support in this regard.

The exact nature of these paramilitary or military formations remains unclear. It was specified, according to the source, that - prior to the acquittal of Jacob Zuma on rape charges - plans had been laid to blow up South African courts if a guilty verdict were returned. It is however possible that such formations could be connected to criminal actions, like cash-in-transit heists, as a means to both the destabilisation of the State and securing funding.

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THE OFFICE OF JACOB ZUMA

In recent weeks the so-called Office of Jacob Zuma has been representing Zuma's interests on the media front. It is suggested that investigations be pursued into this entity, on the basis of the following considerations:

- The presence of Advocate Jurg Prinsloo, a former Conservative Party MP and legal counsel for the murderers of Chris Hani raises the possibility of some alliance between white right wing interests and the Zuma campaign.
- The other frontperson for the Office is Liesl Gottert, *nee* Du Plessis who was, according to well-placed source information, allegedly funded by the late Brett Kebble to produce a television documentary on the thesis that Zuma was the victim of a conspiracy.
- The presence of these two suggests that several different groupings hostile to the Mbeki regime are coalescing around Zuma, and it is important to assess the reach and composition of such alliances of convenience, particularly after the demise of Zuma's major funder Brett Kebble.
- The Office of Jacob Zuma is, likely, also connected to the call by the call by the pro-Zuma Young Communists League to reopen investigations into the assassination of Chris Hani. There have been persistent claims, often insinuated in the media, and sourced to circles close to Prinsloo, that President Thabo Mbeki was implicated in the murder of Hani.

CONCLUDING NOTES

- In the course of the present browse, *prima facie* indications have come to light of various axes of interest that appear to be working, to further

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the cause of Jacob Zuma in partnerships with South African groupings like the SACP and Cosatu. These include the Angolan regime, disaffected parties in the Great Lakes region, and Libya's Muammar Khadafi. In some cases support would appear to be given on a financial level, in others, the commitments appear to be on the level of military and paramilitary support. Investigations should urgently be pursued via the South African Reserve Bank, in order to establish transactions that may impact on the matter at hand. At the same time appropriate agencies should be briefed to further investigate the allegations contained in this report.

- Sources have indicated that significant sums of, possibly illicit, funding are moving through bank accounts connected with the Jacob Zuma Trust, and the Friends of Jacob Zuma. The sourcing of funds moving through these accounts should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.
- This browse has been made difficult by the need for absolute confidentiality and the lack of official resources to verify allegations or follow up on claims. In many cases decisions have been taken to avoid contacting sources who could compromise the confidentiality of enquiries. Strategies could be developed at a later stage to tie such potential informants into co-operation.
- It also needs to be noted that the radical divisions that exist in the ANC and its allies have further bedevilled inquiries, with potential sources clamping up in the prevailing climate of fear, mistrust and uncertainty. Such problems would have to be addressed via strategic interventions at high level, if evidence is to come to light.
- There are indications that the "Zuma camp" should at one level be thought of as a broad front of the malcontents. At another level however, there would appear, as emerges in this document, to be a level of

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conspiratorial co-ordination. The players here need to be urgently identified and appropriate action taken.

- Indications have come to light that groupings associated with the Zuma cause and with former National Intelligence Director General Billy Masetiha, appear to be targeting the public security domain in various business initiatives and partnerships. While the early phase is directed at closed circuit television contracts around the Erkulweni municipality, there are indications that control of wider monitoring initiatives particularly related to port security compliance are also being contemplated.
- Finally, it needs to be highlighted that Zuma's supporters have powerful links into the South African intelligence community. Several well-placed informants have referred to the theft of several boxes of files from NIA, though it is unclear on whose behalf these would have been stolen or to what end.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The present browse has raised issues of sufficient concern to recommend that the National Director of Public Prosecutions be fully briefed of its contents.
2. It is further recommended that the contents of this document be brought to the attention of the Minister of Intelligence and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.
3. It is further recommended that the Presidency be alerted.
4. It is also recommended that other agencies of the South African State be tasked to take some of the work further, as appropriate to their respective mandates.

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5. Consideration should also be given to declaring a preparatory investigation under Section 28 (13) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, to empower the DSO to initiate investigations into the following:

- Money laundering
- Tax evasion
- Contravention of exchange control regulations
- Conspiracy to sedition